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PATENTS AND PUBLIC RIGHTS: THE QUESTIONABLE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PATENTS BEFORE ARTICLE I
TRIBUNALS AFTER STERN V. MARSHALL
Michael Rothwelf
The Supreme Court's recent Stem v. Marshall decision both
rekindled and revived the oft-overlooked public rights exception.
In light of this development, this Article seeks to argue that
patents, where subject to final, binding decisions, are
unconstitutionally before Article I tribunals. Such tribunals
include, for example, the Bankruptcy Court, as well as the newly-
created Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a case that features exotic dancers, oil tycoons, and
seemingly interminable disputes over vast, contested family
fortunes, it may be difficult to discern, at first blush, how the
recent Stern v. Marshall' decision impacts the constitutional
framework dictating important separation of powers concerns.
Beyond the underlying facts and cast of characters, however, at the
heart of the Stern decision is a stark reminder from the nation's
highest court that, despite a generally expansive role envisioned for
modern-day administrative agencies, Article III of the U.S.
Constitution still has meaning in terms of institutional boundaries.2
At issue in Stern was whether the congressional grant of judicial
power to the Article I Bankruptcy Courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(C) passed constitutional muster in light of the Court's
Michael Rothwell is an associate attorney in the Los Angeles office of the
Adli Law Group P.C. His practice focuses primarily upon both life sciences and
engineering-based patent litigation.
' Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
2 Article III, § 1 of the Constitution requires that "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1.
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Article III precedents.' Specifically, the Court sought to determine
on what constitutional grounds, if any, a broad "catch-all"
counterclaim provision-which provided for final adjudication by
an Article I court of a common law tortious interference
claim-passed important institutional safeguards.' In considering
this question, the Court held that only counterclaims implicating
"public rights" satisfied the prohibitive mandate of Article III.'
Given that the counterclaim of tortious interference amongst
private litigants did not fall within the bounds of the public rights
exception, the claim was unconstitutionally before the Article I
tribunal.
Given this important holding, this Article argues that patents
for intellectual property, both in the invalidity and infringement
contexts and where litigated between private parties, do not fall
within the scope of the public rights exception. As such, and after
Stern, it is unconstitutional for the Bankruptcy Courts to issue
final, binding judgments on patent-related counterclaims.
Importantly, though this Article primarily seeks to answer this
narrow question as applied to the Bankruptcy Court, it is necessary
to concede that an analysis that touches upon public rights cannot
be restricted to any one administrative tribunal. After all,
determinations of patent validity as applied to issued patents are
only constitutionally performed by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") because the Federal Circuit has
acknowledged that in the context of reexamination and reissue,
patents are "public rights."6 Thus, any argument to the contrary
invariably operates within this broader context, given that the
' 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2006) established that a bankruptcy court shall
have core jurisdiction over all "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing
claims against the estate." As such, all counterclaims, including those at
common law, were-from a jurisdictional standpoint-properly before the
bankruptcy court.
4 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2595.
5 See id (holding, inter alia, that it was unconstitutional for the Article I
bankruptcy court to issue a final judgment upon the common law tortious
interference counterclaim).
6 See, e.g., Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 on reh'g, 771 F.2d
480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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mode of analysis is necessarily not severable.' Of course, this
point further resonates in light of the enactment of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, which seeks to grant additional
adjudicatory power to the USPTO in the patent arena.'
In order to demonstrate that patents do not fall within the
public rights exception, a stepwise, in-depth analysis of this highly
complicated and oft-contradictory' brand of constitutional
jurisprudence is required. Given the complexities inherent to the
doctrine, only a case-by-case analysis can demonstrate the full
parameters of the exception. Additionally, important Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit cases that either tangentially or directly
impact public rights in the patent context will be evaluated. Here,
critical analysis will be provided regarding the Federal Circuit's
attempt to reconcile McCormick,"0 a precedential Supreme Court
decision that unequivocally declares that the matter of patent
validity belongs to the sole discretion of the Article III courts, with
its notion of what public rights should encapsulate." Similarly, the
Federal Circuit's interpretation of public rights law will be
juxtaposed against the Supreme Court's controlling standard.
7 This Article does not seek to address pragmatic or political concerns.
Without question, there are reasons grounded in pragmatism as to why, e.g.,
some level of Article I activity should be allowed with respect to the resolution
of patent invalidity disputes. In many respects, these concerns form the
foundation of the Federal Circuit's holding in Patlex, which is discussed infra
Part II.G. Instead, this note endeavors to evaluate the public rights rule of law,
as formulated by the Supreme Court, and apply it to patents for intellectual
property.
8 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) (establishing a
broad post-issuance review proceeding where all invalidity arguments may be
heard before the Article I Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
9 Justice Rehnquist once remarked, "[I]n an area of constitutional law such as
that of the 'Article III Courts,' with its frequently arcane distinctions and
confusing precedents ... that this Court should decide no more of a
constitutional question than is absolutely necessary accords ... with sound
judicial policy." N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50,
89 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
'o McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman Co., 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
" See Patlex Corp., 758 F.2d at 604; see also Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck,
959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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In addition to synthesizing the relevant case law regarding
public rights, an analysis of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial as applied to patents is provided. Given that the standard
utilized in most forums for the determination of whether a jury trial
right exists under the Seventh Amendment is either analogous to,
or in some instances, identical with, the standard employed in the
public rights determination, a finding of a right to a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment can necessarily be determinative. 2 In
addition to the jury trial right, the historical nature of patents as
property,13 and the implications for public rights and Article III are
addressed. Though intellectual property patent rights currently
exist in federal statutes, they share in the bundle of rights firmly
established over centuries of American jurisprudence inherent to
all property obligations. 4 Given that patents for intellectual
property share in the same rights as those eligible to patents for
land, Supreme Court precedent addressing separation of powers in
the land patent context will be discussed. Additionally, the
discordant treatment of the International Trade Commission by the
Federal Circuit is evaluated, and though the Circuit's chosen
standard appears to mark a somewhat whimsical departure from
traditional public rights rule, the implications of the ITC's limited
collateral estoppel effect in patent determinations as applied to
separation of powers considerations are highlighted. Lastly, and
perhaps most importantly, the applicability of waiver, as applied to
the Article III institutional safeguard, is addressed.'" As noted
during the analysis of Stern, waiver still plays an integral, albeit
undefined, role in modem-day public rights jurisprudence. After
12 The standards, and any existing homologies, are discussed infra Part II.C.
13 Beyond the intellectual property context; e.g., land.
14 Judge Newman, writing for the Federal Circuit in Patlex, somewhat
ironically proclaimed "[a] patent for an invention is as much property as a patent
for land. The right rests on the same foundation and is surrounded ... by the
same sanctions." Patlex, 758 F.2d at 599 (quoting Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v.
Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)) (emphasis added).
15 Compare to the personal right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Prior Supreme Court cases have declared that because Article III implements
separation of powers schemes core to the structuring of the national government,
its requirements cannot be waived by the private litigant. See, e.g., Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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all, the common law defamation proof of claim is only saved from
constitutionality concerns because the primary petitioner for
bankruptcy ostensibly waived any and all Article III limitations by
filing for bankruptcy in the first place." However, much
ambiguity still lingers regarding waiver in the Article III context.
The Court's decisions regarding the legitimacy of waiver as
applied to foundational separation of powers mandates will be
evaluated." As one may suspect, this area of constitutional law
lacks delineating clarity.
This Article will synthesize the aforementioned elements and
will argue that, in light of the various attributes inherent to patents,
they do not comport with the public rights calculus. If patents do
not fall within the public rights exception, then they are
unconstitutional under the newly-limited bankruptcy counterclaim
provision after Stern. The broader implications of such a finding,
especially in light of the important matter of waiver, will be further
addressed and explained.
II. ARTICLE III AND THE PUBLIC RIGHTS EXCEPTION: SUPREME
COURT AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRECEDENT ESTABLISH THE
BOUNDS OF THE EXCEPTION, AND FURTHER DEPICTS ITS
COMPLEXITY
Our discussion of the public rights exception .. .has not been entirely
consistent, and the exception has been the subject of some debate . ...
During the course of public rights history, many Justices,
including Chief Justice Roberts, have lamented the turbulent nature
of the exception. As with most brands of constitutional law, each
case, at least to some degree, represents a building block upon the
last. Certainly, competing concepts arise within the developmental
framework of this Article III carve-out. The goal then is to
16 As the Stern analysis will demonstrate, however, this element of the opinion
did not command a majority. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (U.S. 2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
1 If waiver cannot cure constitutionality concerns under Article III before an
Article I bankruptcy tribunal, it cannot cure infirmities in other Article I venues
as well (consider, e.g., the USPTO).
18 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611 (observing that the Court's esoteric brand of
jurisprudence regarding public rights has, at times, been contradictory).
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evaluate each landmark case in detail; from this analysis, trends,
unifying concepts, binding principles, and outlying propositions
that never achieved acceptance can be identified,
compartmentalized, and either utilized or discounted. With this
approach in mind, and preemptively acknowledging the
intrinsically complicated nature of this frequently overlooked but
fundamentally important area of law, a holistic evaluation of the
relevant cases is required. Once the relevant cases have been
discussed, and the unifying elements have been identified, one may
seek to determine whether a particular cause of action falls within
the penumbra of the public rights exception. This discussion
begins with an evaluation of the seminal case regarding public
rights: Murray's Lessee."
A. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.
The public rights exception finds its historical roots in the
Supreme Court's 1856 Murray's Lessee decision.20 In this case,
the Court was asked, in part, to resolve the question of whether the
issuance of a distress warrant calling for the sale of private land by
an Article I Solicitor of the Treasury was "sufficient, under the
constitution "21 The Court was careful to clarify that the
question presented was fundamentally one of separation of powers.
Given that Article III requires that "the judicial power of the
United States to be vested in one supreme court and in [] inferior
courts,"22 to the extent that the Article I officer's actions affecting
title to plaintiffs private property represented "an exercise of the
judicial power of the United States, the proceeding was void; for
the officers who performed these acts could exercise no part of that
judicial power."23 As such, the resolution of the dispute turned on
' Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272
(1856).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 274. The plaintiff, a former collector of customs for the port of New
York, had failed to the transfer the totality of the collected fees to government
coffers and as such his land was sold by the Article I officer to resolve the fiscal
discrepancy existing between what was collected and what was eventually
turned over to the government. Id. at 272.22 Id. at 275.23Id. at 272.
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whether the actions of the solicitor amounted to such an "exercise
of judicial power;" if the aforementioned action was found to fall
within the purview of those reserved to the judiciary, then it
impermissibly violated the tenets of Article III.
According to the Court, mere judgment upon law and fact
alone is insufficient to bring an action within the restrictive
confines of Article III, even though such judgment may be, "in an
enlarged sense," an act of judicial character.24 Instead, the defining
analysis is whether the subject matter implicated by a particular
congressional act constitutes a "judicial controversy."2 5 The Court,
though declining to provide a strict definition, held that suits
specifically grounded in common law, equity, or admiralty fell
within the unassailable realm of judicial cognizance." However,
and separate from suits expressly reserved for Article III courts,
there existed a subset of matters involving "public rights," which,
though susceptible to judicial resolution, were still within the grasp
of congressional determination.2 7 Importantly, the Court
established a delineating standard that in many respects was akin to
source-based analysis. Specifically, if the right at issue "depends
upon the will of congress,"-i.e., if Congress is the sole creator
and proprietor of a particular right, then the appropriate
adjudication of that right, whether it be before an Article I or
Article III tribunal, exists wholly within the discretion of the
branch of government that created it.28
24 Id. at 280.25 1d. at 281.26 Id. at 284.27 Id. at 284-85.
28 Id. at 284. Interestingly, the Court further remarked that, "[i]t is true, also,
that even in a suit between private persons to try a question of private right, the
action of the executive power, upon a matter committed to its determination by
the constitution and laws, is conclusive." Id. at 284-85 (emphasis added) (citing
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1853)).
Certainly the governance of intellectual property and, more specifically, the laws
regulating patents are committed to Congressional cognizance by the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. But see McCormick Harvesting
Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman Co., 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898) for the Court's
conclusion that patent invalidity falls within the sole control of Article III courts.
Additionally, patent infringement is certainly a dispute between private persons
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. Applying this newly-crafted subset of public rights to the facts
before it, the Court found that, pursuant to the congressional power
to collect and disburse revenues, as ordained by the Constitution,
Congress had the sole capacity to determine what route, if any, the
government could seek to recoup funds not transferred by a
receiver of public money.29 Given that the right was fundamentally
executive in nature, congressional judgment was the sole
determinant dictating whether, and under what circumstances, the
plaintiff may have his issue determined by an Article III court.
That 'a collector may file a bill and give security, and "thus arrest
the summary proceedings, only proves that congress thought it not
necessary to pursue them . .. until a decision should be made by
the court ... and of this necessity congress alone is the judge."30
Importantly, the Court was also clear.to identify that the United
States was a party to the case."1 Undoubtedly, this factor weighed
heavily on the Court's analysis regarding whether the issue before
it qualified as a public right. 32  However, though seemingly
remarking that the presence of the United States as a party factored
significantly into its public rights analysis, the Court was also
careful to establish that this element alone was hardly the sole
determinant. Specifically, the Court remarked that "even in a suit
between private persons to try a question of private right, the
action of executive power, upon a matter committed to its
determination by the constitution and laws," is a public right.33
regarding a private right granted by the actions of the executive power, but has it
been committed to executive determination? Later Supreme Court decisions
discuss the necessity of an "expertise" element in Article I tribunal public rights
adjudication. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 573, 590-91 (1985). It is unclear whether a bankruptcy court, adjudicating
a claim of patent infringement, meets this heightened standard.
29 Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 281.
3 0 d. at 285 (emphasis added).
3' Id. at 275.
32 As an example of the type of action that the Court intended to fall within
the scope of the public rights exception, the Court specifically identified actions
for equitable claims to land in ceded territories. Id. at 284. in such an action,
the United States would obviously be a party.
3 See id. at 284-85 (emphasis added).
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B. McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Aultman
The Supreme Court's decision in McCormick4 is of pivotal
importance with respect to the constitutionality of patents in
bankruptcy court. Though the case does not address the issue of
public rights directly, it does discuss the proposed constitutionality
of a non-Article III tribunal adjudicating the contested validity of
an issued patent." The central question in the case was whether a
patent examiner, appointed per congressional authority, could
reject claims in a reissue application for reasons relating to
inadequate patentable novelty." Though the claims were rejected
during the reissue proceeding, the claims themselves still belonged
to an issued patent." Thus, the Court was confronted with a
separation of powers question: could an Article I patent examiner,
within the bounds of the Constitution, invalidate claims in an
issued patent for insufficient novelty?38
The Court immediately established that a patent, upon
issuance, is not subject to revocation or cancellation by any
executive agent, including the President of the United States.3 9
Given that an issued patent "has become the property of the
patentee . . . [it] is entitled to the same legal protection as other
property."4 0 As a patent for invention is subject to the exact set of
constitutional restrictors applicable to a grant for lands, Congress,
cannot divest a patent owner of title without impeachment by suit
34 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898).
35 Id.3 6 Id. at 606.
31 Id. at 607-08.
31Id. at 611.
39 Id. at 608.
40 Id. at 609. The constitutionality of private property disputes in non-Article
III tribunals is highly relevant to the analysis of patents before Article I
tribunals. The Supreme Court has, on many occasions, analogized between
patent rights and private, "other property" on many occasions. See, e.g., id. An
analysis of the distinction between Article I and Article III in the context of
property suits generally, and any issues of constitutionality implicated therein, is
provided infra Part II.F.
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in an Article III tribunal.4 1 By proxy, Congress' executive
tribunals-even while maintaining the power and authority to issue
patents of either variety in the first instance-cannot divest a
patent owner without impeachment either. Thus, issues of patent
invalidity fall within the strict purview of Article III courts.
However, the Court carefully maintained the integrity of the
reissue process. Specifically, the Court held that although a non-
Article III tribunal could not sit on issues of patent invalidity per
se, they still retained the ability to "reissue" an amended patent
where a patentee has discovered an error, defect, accident, or
mistake that undercuts the perceived validity of a particular patent.
The Court precisely defined the bounds of appropriate action for
the Article I patent examiner. The court explained that, "[tihe
object of a patentee applying for a reissue is not to reopen the
question of the validity of the original patent, but to rectify any
error which may have been found to have arisen from his
inadvertence or mistake."4 2 Any unilateral action by the examiner,
however, at least with respect to alleged deficiencies within the
issued patent, not implicated by the patentee and relating to, e.g.,
error and mistake, is an impermissible usurpation of authority
reserved for the judiciary under Article III.4 Stated more
concisely, "[an] attempt to cancel a[n] [issued] patent ... by the
examiner ... would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of
the government by the executive."4
41 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609. This is a critical distinction. Here, the Court
clearly indicates that the power to issue is, as guaranteed by the Constitution,
executive in nature. Id. However, this is not the sole basis of analysis. Id.
42 Id. at 610. This concept of mistake, remedied at the behest of the patentee
nonetheless, is exceptionally important. In the Federal Circuit's two decisions
regarding the matter, Patlex and Joy, this notion of "mistake" forms the
backbone of the Circuit's analysis regarding the applicability of patent invalidity
to the public rights analysis. Id. However, this analysis implicates a logical
discord that appears to contravene controlling Supreme Court precedent.
43 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 612. Though this decision was issued in 1898, it is
still precedential with respect to its applicability of patent invalidity to Article III
jurisprudence.
4 Id. Implicit to its holding that patent invalidity belongs within the sole
discretion of Article III courts, is the Court's underlying acknowledgement that
invalidity, though a right granted by the executive, did not come in under the
296 [VOL. 13: 287
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C. Ex parte Bakelite Corp.
Ex parte Bakelite45 is an important case because it marks a
further step in the Court's development of the public rights
exception, even though it did not address the issue of patents
directly.46 Bakelite arose from a dispute under the Tariff Act of
1922, which in its core application, was formulated to protect U.S.
domestic industry from acts of unfair importation and sale of
goods.4 7 Pursuant to this goal, the Act empowered a Tariff
Commission, obviously executive in nature, to, e.g., make findings
and recommendations relative to the rights of the accused importer.
To the extent that the Commission issued findings adverse to an
importer, then the importer had a right to appeal to the Court of
Customs Appeals on questions of law.
Bakelite Corporation filed a complaint against a host of
importers before the Tariff Commission. The Commission found
the behavior of the importers injurious to domestic injury, and
recommended that the identified articles be excluded from entry.
The importers appealed to the Court of Customs Appeals. In
response, Bakelite Corporation filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition, arguing that the Court of Customs Appeals lacked
constitutional authority to re-hear the importers claims.48
The question presented to the Court was two-fold: First, was
the Court of Customs Appeals a legislative court or a constitutional
court? And second, in light of the definition ascribed in part I, was
the delegation of authority to the court constitutional under
prevailing separation of powers jurisprudence? With respect to
public rights exception. Id. The Federal Circuit, seizing upon the concepts of
"error" and "mistake," utilizes this potential carve out to bring public rights into
the discussion. Id.
45 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
46 id.
47 Id. at 446 (identifying § 316 as the relevant section of the Tariff Act).
48 Id. at 447. The Court remarked that Article III courts are "constitutional
courts," i.e. courts that can participate in the exercise of judicial power, and "can
be invested with no other jurisdiction." Id. at 449. Conversely, courts created
by Congress by virtue of "the exertion of other powers" are labeled legislative
courts, and are committed to the executive with such "other powers independent
of Article III." Id.
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part I, the Court first provided a stepwise definition of legislative
courts. Territorial courts "created in virtue of the general right of
sovereignty" did not fall within the envelope of judicial power as
defined by the Article I.'9 Similarly, the Court recited that the
courts for the District of Columbia are fundamentally legislative in
character, as provided for by Congress."o Importantly, and
reminiscent of Murray's Lessee, the Court classified special
tribunals, where the chief charge was "to examine and determine
various matters, arising between the government and others" as
legislative." Though such matters are susceptible to judicial
determination, the mode of determination, whether based in Article
I or Article III, lies wholly within congressional discretion.
According to the Court, claims against the United States fall within
this subset of cases "arising between government and.others." As
such, claimants have to no right to sue unless Congress consents;
no court may take judicial cognizance of such claims without
express congressional approval. Instead, where Congress deems it
appropriate, it may relegate such matters to remediation in a purely
executive setting.52
The Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury is inherently
linked to the concept of separation of powers in the Federal
Government." Since the Seventh Amendment preserves the right
49 Id. at 450 (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 546
(1828)).
5o Id. at 450. Further examples include the United States Court for China and
the consular courts. Such courts are legislative in form and function and are
emblematic of the executive's power, as conferred by the Constitution, to
uphold treaties and maintain commerce. Id. at 451.
5' Id. (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 452. The Court provides the example of the Court of Claims: given
that the court was created in the form of a special tribunal with the power to
determine claims against the United States for claims for money-the power to
pay debts unequivocally is the responsibility of the executive per the
Constitution-it was an appropriate allocation of power to an Article I tribunal,
even if, by its nature, it related to matters susceptible of judicial determination.
Id.
s3 See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
272, 284 (1856) (holding, inter alia, that suits at common law fell within the
strict cognizance of the judiciary). In many respects, this analysis is not
meaningfully different from the one required for the determination of a jury trial
298 [VOL. 13: 287
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to trial by jury in suits at common law, there is an inevitable and
necessary overlap in the analysis required to determine the
applicability of the jury trial right guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment and the reasoning required for the public rights
determination. Though the Court in Bakelite does not explicitly
identify this correlation in its opinion, it does conduct an analysis
of the applicability of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial.54 The Court does this in its example of the Court of Claims.
Given that suits before the Court of Claims are "not suits at
common law within its true meaning," the Seventh Amendment
does not control." Further merging the analysis, the Court remarks
that the government cannot be sued unless it consents. Thus a
government has complete discretion to determine what rules, if
any, apply to the tribunal of its choosing." Such rules include the
potential "intervention of the jury."" Thus, the Court of Claims
was appropriately categorized as legislative."
right. See, e.g., Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340
(Fed Cir. 2001).
54 See supra note 42. Though not addressed currently, this merging of routes
of analysis is important in the context of patents and will be addressed in later
stages of this Article. See infra Part III. Inherent to the Court's review of the
Seventh Amendment jury trial right in the Court of Claims example is the idea
that, where a controlling precedent has already determined that a jury trial right
applies, then the public rights analysis is then necessarily complete. See
Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 454.
" See Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 453.
56 id.
5 Id. at 454. Interestingly, the Court decided to address the jury trial issue
sua sponte. See id. That the Court raised this issue, without prompting from
counsel, further establishes the link between the jury trial rights and public
rights, even though in the context of this decision, the Court couched its analysis
in terms of legislative versus constitutional courts (with the applicability of the
jury trial right weighing heavily on this determination). Id.
58 In addition to the Court of Claims, the Court also provided the example of
the Court of Private Land Claims. Id. at 456. This Court dealt exclusively with
private claims to lands ceded by Mexico to the United States. Id. In the Court's
view, this was clearly a legislaiive tribunal. Id. Similarly, the Court cited the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, which was created to deal with
claims to membership in Indian Tribes. Id. at 457. At the time, the rules for
membership rested wholly within the discretion of Congress, making the court
legislative in nature. Id.
SPRING 2012] 299
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Applying the distinctions drawn between legislative and
constitutional tribunals to the Court of Customs Appeals, the Court
first established that Congress established the court in question
pursuant to its power to lay and collect duties on import.
Additionally, and as seen before, the Court highlighted the
importance of the government as a party.59 Because the
Government is a party, the Court concluded that "nothing [before
the Court of Customs Appeals] . . . inherently or necessarily
requires judicial determination."6 0 Thus, it was "very plainly"
shown that the Court of Custom Appeals was legislative, and not
constitutional, in character.'
D. Crowell v. Benson
Crowell v. Benson' is another case of pivotal importance with
respect to the public rights exception." The suit was brought to
enjoin the enforcement of a judgment issued by the deputy
commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation
Commission per his authority under the Longshore and Harbor
5 Id. at 458 (establishing that the Court of Customs Appeals determined
matters arising between the government and others regarding the application of
executive law).
60 id.
61 Id. at 459. Though this decision is merely a direct analysis of one particular
court and asks whether that court fits within the legislative or constitutional
mold, it is still important in the broader context of the public rights analysis.
The decision's detailed discussion of prior examples of legislative courts, the
jury trial right, and role of government as a party was formative in the
development of the public rights doctrine. See, e.g., Stem v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594 (2011).
62 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
63 In Thomas and Schor, Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in both cases,
crafted a public rights analysis that stepped away from the somewhat strict
interpretation of Crowell. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568, 589 (1985); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
839-51 (1986). However, in later decisions, such as Granfinanciera and Stern,
the Court appeared to return to the holding espoused in Crowell, citing and
relying upon it heavily. See Granfinanciera v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-53
(1989); Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2598. Not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor dissented
in Granfinanciera. Id. at 91. O'Connor's dissent notwithstanding, the
importance of Crowell with respect to public rights jurisprudence cannot be
understated. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2598.
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Workers' Compensation Act.' The complaint alleged, inter alia,
that the deputy commissioner's adjudication was an
unconstitutional violation of the Article III mandate requiring
separation of powers.65
The Court initially remarked that the Act related to injuries
incurred on the navigable waters of the United States, and thus
deals with maritime law. Given that § 2 of Article III grants
exclusive jurisdiction to the judiciary governing matters related to
admiralty and maritime issues, any suit governing admiralty law
before an Article I tribunal represented an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial power.66 However, in its analysis of the Act,
the role of the commissioner, and Article III, the Court
immediately set out that the case "presents a distinct question."67
Murray 's Lessee had established that suits in admiralty law
unequivocally fell within the sole custodianship of the Article III
courts. However, the question presented by the commissioner's
finding in Crowell related merely to the "determination of fact."68
This distinction-that the commissioner is only empowered to
issue advisory, and thus not final, opinions on questions of law,
whereas the resolution of questions of fact are final-is what
preserved the constitutionality of the Act. In the Court's view, as
the determination of a legal question is expressly reserved by the
terms of the act to the Article III courts that have jurisdiction in
admiralty, Murray's Lessee, and more foundationally, Article III,
were not violated.69 Thus, in the Court's eyes, the congressional
purpose is not to usurp the role of the judiciary under Article III,
6 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 36 (noting that the Commissioner had found that
Knudsen had been injured while employed by Benson during the course of his
employment and service upon the navigable waters of the United States).
65 d
66 See id. at 39 (further remarking, however, that the general authority of
Congress to revise maritime law is beyond dispute); see also Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856) (holding that the
judicial power under Article III extended to suits at common law, equity, or
admiralty).
67 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 49.68 Id. (emphasis added).69 id.
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but instead to "facilitate the exercise by the court of its
jurisdiction."7 0
With respect to the constitutionality of the determination of
fact under Article III by a legislative court, the Court again recited
the now-familiar holding from Murray's Lessee: A fundamental
distinction lies between cases of "private right" and those arising
"between the Government and persons subject to its authority in
connection with the performance of [its] constitutional
functions."' Thus, according to the Court in Crowell, Congress
may establish legislative courts to assist with matters, though
susceptible to judicial control but not necessarily requiring it per
the Constitution, "arising between the government and others."72
At issue, however, in Crowell was a private right, i.e. the
liability of one individual to another under the controlling law.
With respect to private rights, the Court held that "there is no
requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the
judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts
shall be made by judges."7 ' The Court mad clear, however, that
determinations of fact in issues at common law is a role reserved,
by the Constitution, for the jury.74 Where the case is one of either
equity or admiralty, then the fact finder may then appropriately be
a non-Article III agent or tribunal. Further, the scope of the factual
determination authorized by the Act in Crowell is highly restricted;
the commissioner determined questions of fact related to, for
example, the circumstances of the injury sustained and little
more.7
Thus, given that the nature of the factual determination
assigned to the commissioner by Congress was limited in scope,
and further given that factual determination was one of admiralty,
and not common law, Congress was within its constitutional
70 id.
71 Id. at 50.
72 Id. (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
73 Id at 53 (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 51-52.
7 Id. at 64.
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mandate by assigning this issue, under the Act, to the resolution of
a commissioner."
E. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission
In 1970, in order to provide additional redress for employees
injured on the job, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and
Health Act ("OSHA").n This Act permitted the Federal
government, under the direction of the Secretary of Labor, to both
obtain abatement orders and impose civil penalties. To the extent
an employer wished to contest a penalty issued by the Secretary of
Labor, it had the option of pursuing an evidentiary hearing before
the OSHA Commission. If the Commission affirmed the findings
of the Secretary of Labor, the aggrieved employer then had the
ability to petition for judicial review before the appropriate court of
appeals." However, and importantly in light of Crowell, the Act
76 Id. at 54. The holding in this case was thus two-fold. One, it was an
reaffirmation of the holding in Murray that where the government is a party, and
the government's ability to be sued in the first place is contingent upon consent,
the government may design, at its discretion, the tribunal, as well as any
corresponding rules. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856). This is the first variety of "public rights" under
Crowell. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50. The second variety crafted in Crowell
pertains wholly to private rights. Id. at 53. Where a determination that is fully
factual in nature has been assigned to an executive tribunal, it may be
constitutional under Article III provided that it stems from disputes in equity or
admiralty. Id. at 51-53. Again, and as seen in Bakelite, the importance of the
jury trial right is demonstrated by the Court. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 453. Given
that at common law factual determinations must, assuming the absence of
waiver, be made by a jury, the Court automatically carved this subset of law out
from the public rights exception. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 52. Thus, at least where
factual determinations have been assigned to an executive tribunal, where there
is a constitutional right to a jury, there cannot be public right.
77 Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 651-78
(1970).
78 See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442, 445 (1977) (remarking that the administrative remedies provided for
in the Act existed independently of, and separately from, any rights that may
exist in state statutes and common law).
79 id.
8o Id.
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provided that the Commission's finding regarding issues of fact,
"if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole, shall be conclusive."" Given the terms of the statute, a
penalty may be imposed, collected, and enforced as final without
an employer ever being presented with the opportunity for a jury
determination of the factual issues underlying the alleged
violation.82 Thus, the issue before the Court in Atlas was whether
the Seventh Amendment prevented Congress from assigning
factual determinations, subject only to judicial review under the
substantial evidence standard, to a non-Article III administrative
agency.83
The Court initially remarked that the determination of whether
a jury trial right applies under the Seventh Amendment is well
known.84 Specifically, disputes tried at common law, as opposed
to either equity or admiralty, implicate a jury trial right."
Importantly, where there is a public right, there cannot be a jury
trial right.86 Regarding its definition of public rights, the Court in
Atlas was careful to distinguish its holding from Crowell." In
Crowell, only private rights were implicated, and the Court in Atlas
remarked that the holding in Crowell established that, where
private rights were in play, Congress had the authority to assign
Id. at 447.
82 Id. at 445.
83 Id. at 449. Though the issue of the case is phrased by the Court in terms of
a Seventh Amendment analysis, the public rights exception factors heavily in its
decision. Id. at 456. Therefore, like Crowell and Bakelite, the commingled
nature of the Seventh Amendment and public rights is again demonstrated.
84 id
8 5 Id. This method of determination is indicative of the underlying history; i.e.
suits at common law, before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, were
traditionally tried before a jury. See Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 453
(1929). This is contrasted against suits of equity or admiralty, where a jury was
typically not present.
86 Atlas, 430 U.S. at 450. To belabor the point, these concepts cannot be
mutually exclusive. If there is a public right, then there cannot be a jury trial
right under the Seventh Amendment according to the Court's jurisprudence. See
Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 453 (1929). Conversely, if there is a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury, then there cannot be a public right. The logic is necessarily
reciprocal.
" Atlas, 430 U.S. at 457.
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limited fact-finding functions to an adjunct." Where true public
rights were implicated, e.g., cases in which the government sues in
its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes
within the power of Congress to enact, the Seventh Amendment
does not prohibit Congress from assigning the fact-finding function
and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the
jury would be incompatible."
Thus, where the government is a party, and where the right is
predicated upon a federal statute, Congress may assign the
resolution of a dispute regarding such a right "exclusively to an
administrative agency [for the determination of] ... whether a
violation has in fact occurred."" Note that with the usage of the
phrase "whether a violation has . . . occurred," the Court is again
placing emphasis upon the role of legislative tribunals as fact-
finders." This is due, in part, to the question presented by the case:
is there a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial where Congress
has delegated a fact-finding function with the possibility of finality
to an Article I administrative tribunal? 92
Addressing this question broadly, the Court held that where
Congress has created a new public right under federal statute, it
may assign the adjudication of such a right to an Article I
tribunal. Given that the congressional discretion regarding such
matters is complete, any Constitutional mandate to the contrary
8 8 Id. at 450 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-65 (1932)).
89 Id. at 450.
90 Id.
91 Id. In Crowell, the Court made clear its intention that, where private rights
are at issue, fact-finding at the Article I level was appropriate only where the
tribunal was acting as an adjunct. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54. In Atlas, the Court
clarifies that with respect to public rights-and the Court expressly identifies the
example of the Federal Government suing in its sovereign capacity-the fact-
finding function of Article I tribunals is significantly broader. See Atlas, 430
U.S. at 450.
92 Atlas, 430 U.S. at 454.
9 Id. Interestingly, the Court addresses the "adjudication" of new statutory
public rights broadly. Id This suggests that the Court is confirming prior
holdings that, where there is a true public right, Congress may delegate complete
authority over that right to an Article I court. This authority transcends mere
fact-finding as an adjunct. Of course, the Court was clear to define public rights
existing where the government is a party. Id.
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would be incompatible with the prevailing public rights
jurisprudence. 94 Thus, where there is a constitutional right to a trial
by jury under the Seventh Amendment, there cannot be a public
right.95 More directly, where suits at common law implicate a
Seventh Amendment jury trial, the applicability of the public rights
exception is foreclosed.
Interestingly, the Court in Atlas directly addressed its precedent
regarding the assignment of fact-finding to Article I tribunals.96
Because there may have been confusion after the holdings in
Bakelite and Crowell, the Atlas Court expressly clarified that:
[o]ur prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those
situations involving "public rights," e.g., where the Government is
involved in its. sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute
creating enforceable- public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and
property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases as well are not at
all implicated.97
This statement, read in light of Crowell, indicates that the Court in
Atlas wanted to reaffirm that where private rights are implicated, a
non-Article III tribunal may only operate in its capacity as an
adjunct.98 Any delegation of authority beyond that normally
reserved for an adjunct is thus an unconstitutional violation of
Article III."1 Given that the government was involved, in its
sovereign capacity, in an action relative to a dispute regarding the
rights granted under the Federal OSHA, the Court held that the
delegation of fact-finding function to a non-Article III tribunal was
not an unconstitutional assignment of power.'o
94 See id. at 455.
9 See id.
9 Id at 458.
97 Id. (emphasis added). As indicated in the quotation, the court expressly
carved out private tort and property actions from the public rights exception. Id.
An action for patent infringement is a private tort.
98 id.
9 Id.
1o See id That the Commission could issue findings that 1) were susceptible
to becoming final, or 2) were only eligible for a heightened standard of review,
did not dissuade the Court from finding that the delegation of power under the
public rights exception was constitutional. Id.
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F. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co.o' is a particularly important case given that its subject matter
directly pertains to public rights within the Bankruptcy Court
arena.102  In Northern Pipeline, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of the procedural provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978.'03 The Act, by its terms, called for the creation of an
adjunct to the district court.0  This adjunct was to be known as the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the district.o' Pursuant to the
power granted under the Act, the bankruptcy adjunct was to have
"jurisdiction over all 'civil proceedings arising under title 11 [the
Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to cases under title
1.' "106 Under this broad grant of power, the bankruptcy court
was entitled to hear a wide range of matters, including claims
arising under state law paradigms. 0 7
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. filed a petition for
reorganization and, under the broad jurisdictional grant of the Act,
filed suit against Marathon alleging breaches of contract and
warranty, as well as misrepresentation, coercion, and duress.'0 s
Marathon, in response, sought dismissal on the grounds that the
Act was a constitutional conferral of power otherwise expressly
reserved for Article III courts.'09 The Court was thus presented
with a question, in its core application, as to whether the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violated the bounds of Article III by
conferring judicial power to adjuncts who did not enjoy the
protections and safeguards guaranteed under the Article.no
10 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
102 See id.
'
3 Id. at 57.
104 Id. at 53.
"os See id.
106 Id. at 54 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1976)).
107 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 55. Further, under the Congressional grant of
power, the bankruptcy adjuncts were allowed to issue declaratory judgments
under § 2201 of the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
1os Id. at 55.
109 Id.
no Ild. at 62.
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Importantly in Northern Pipeline, the Court did not author a
majority opinion. Instead, the Court's opinion was presented by a
plurality, which was joined by a concurrence."' The plurality
began its analysis of the constitutionality of the Act by pinpointing
several instances where Congress may permissibly bring certain
subject matter within the cognizance of Article I tribunals.
According to the plurality, there are only "three narrow situations
... [where] the congressional assertion of a power to create
legislative courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to,
the constitutional mandate of separation of powers."" 2 These
narrow situations, sequentially addressed by the Court, fall within
the three following categories: 1) non-Article III territorial
courts,"' 2) courts-martial," 4 and 3) cases which involve public
rights."'
Regarding the third category, public rights, the plurality
adopted the restrictive approach of Crowell and remarked that
"[t]he doctrine extends only to matters arising 'between the
Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with
the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments,' and only to matters that historically could
have been determined exclusively by those departments.""' Given
that Congress retained full authority over such matters, the
plurality reasoned, it retained complete discretion as to how they
may or may not be resolved."' In determining whether a matter
"' The plurality opinion was joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ. Id. at 52. Rehnquist, J. and O'Connor, J. concurred with the
plurality. Id. at 89. Commonalities inherent to both the plurality and concurring
opinions will be identified.
112 Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
113 Id. According to the Court, where no state operates as sovereign, it has
been intended, "from the earliest days of the Republic," that Congress is to
operate as the general government. Id.
114 Id. at 66.
"
5 Id. at 67.
11 Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). In light of McCormick, see discussion at Part II.B.,
there is a question as to whether patent invalidity is appropriately determined
"exclusively" by either the legislative or executive branch.
"
7 Id. at 80.
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falls under congressional authority, a court will conduct an
analysis, based on the claims at issue, and determine whether the
matter had traditionally been one reserved for judicial
determination."'
Interestingly, the plurality declined to precisely define the
distinction between public rights and private rights, and further
remarked that its precedents had not accomplished this goal
either."' Instead, it was enough, in the plurality's estimation, to
establish that in order for there to be a public right, the right must,
at an absolute minimum, arise "between the government and
others."'20 However, the plurality does remark that matters of
private rights generally entail the liability of one individual to
another. 2 ' Given that private rights "lie at the core of the
historically recognized judicial power," their constitutional
adjudication rests solely within the realm of the Article III
courts.'22 Where there is ambiguity as to whether a particular claim
falls within the public rights doctrine, the plurality remarks that
"the presumption is in favor of Art. III courts."'2 3
Applying its analysis of separation of powers principles to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, the plurality held that the substantive
legal rights at issue did not fall under the public rights exception.
Specifically, "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which
is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be
distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private
rights."'24 Given that the contract right in question implicates the
'18 See id. at 68. As an example of the restrictive analysis required for the
public rights determination, the Court quoted Ex parte Bakelite Corp. for the
notion that the proper role of a legislative court is the determination of "matters
arising between the Government and others in the executive administration and
application of the customs laws." Id. at 69 (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 458 (1929)).
"
9 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70.
120 Id. at 69.
121 Id. at 70.
122id
123 Id. at 70 n.23.
124 Id. at 71. Interestingly, regarding the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations, the plurality merely remarks that such activity "may well be a 'public
right,' " leaving its status unconfirmed. Id. (emphasis added).
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liability of one individual to another under the law defined, it is a
private right not susceptible to non-Article III determination.125
Although Congress maintains constitutional authority to establish
laws on the subject of bankruptcy, and pursuant to this authority,
the ability to create legislative courts charged with the enforcement
of such bankruptcy laws, "where Art. III does apply, all of the
legislative powers specified in Art. I and elsewhere are subject to
it."l 26
The plurality held that Article III forbids the adjudication of all
bankruptcy-related controversies by the non-Article III adjunct.127
If "related" is the standard for constitutionality under Article III,
then nearly any specific grant of power under Article I can lead to
a near-complete usurpation of Article III autonomy.' Such a rule,
if adopted, would "effectively eviscerate the constitutional
guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch of the Federal
Government." 29 Thus, Congress is barred by the language of the
Constitution from establishing legislative courts with jurisdiction
over any and all matters pertaining to those arising under the
bankruptcy laws.' Though Congress maintains an unassailable
right to legislate pursuant to Article I, it must do so while
simultaneously recognizing the equally unassailable promise of
Article III for an independent judiciary.
125 Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). Note that the
plurality identified the liability aspect as the delineator; i.e., the fact that one
private individual was potentially liable to another brought the allegation within
the scope of private rights. Id. The fact that the right derived from state law
was hardly the sole criterion. See id. Consider what the plurality's assessment
of contract damages would be as applied to patent infringement, where private
entities litigate allegations of trespasses against property.
126 Id. at 73; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. Thus, where there is overlap
between Article III and Article 1, Article III controls. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
73.
127 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 76.
128 Id. at 73. The plurality cites Art. 1, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution and its
grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce as an example. Id.
If the standard is one of some mere tangential relation to this grant of power, the
bounds-and perceived relevance-of Article III become unclear. See id. at 73-
74.
129 Id. at 74.
30 Id. at 76.
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In addition to the arguments above, the plurality addressed
whether the bankruptcy judge is, in actuality, an adjunct of the
district court."' Prior cases, such as Crowell, established and
approved the constitutionality of the use of true adjuncts by the
Article III courts.'3 2 However, according to the plurality, there is a
critical difference between congressional authority to create Article
I legislative courts and the congressional authority to create
adjuncts. Adjuncts do not serve as an exception to Article III;
instead, they perform a limited adjudicatory function while all
"essential attributes of the judicial power" remain with the Article
III courts."' Conversely, Article I legislative courts are created
under very limited circumstances and perform a pseudo-judicial
function.134 With respect to adjuncts, the Court had, in the past,
expressly ratified their use by Article III tribunals in a fact-finding
role."' However, the adjunct, even when merely assisting in a
fact-finding capacity, must remain within the control of the
assigning court.'36 De novo review and the ability to rehear or call
for more evidence are potential hallmarks of appropriate command
and control between a court and its adjunct."'
' Id. at 76-87.
132 Id. at 77-79.
133 Id. at 77 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). The
plurality further explains several indicia for recognizing whether the essential
attributes of judicial power have been maintained in the Article III court. Id. at
80-81. An Article III court, when interacting with its adjunct, should reserve
the full authority to adjudicate upon matters of law. Id. at 81. Additionally, the
ability to "make an informed, final decision" should rest solely with the Article
III judge. Id. (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682 (1980)).
134 Id. at 64.
"s Id. at 80-81 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51). The plurality, however,
discussed some additional limitations on Congress's ability to delegate a fact-
finding function to non-Article III adjuncts. Id. at 80-81. Specifically, the
plurality remarked that where "Congress creates a substantive federal right," or
where there is a "congressionally created right[]," then "some factual
determinations may be made by a specialized factfinding [sic] tribunal." Id.
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). This can hardly be read as carte blanche
where fact-finding is implicated. The clear limitations speak for themselves.
Additionally, the plurality in Northern Pipeline did not seek to create new law;
instead, "we simply reaffirm the holding of Crowell." Id at 81 n.32.
136 See id. at 81-82.
"' Id. at 82 n.33.
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Given that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 conferred to the
bankruptcy adjunct all essential attributes of judicial power, it was
deemed to be unconstitutional.' Unlike the situation before the
Court in Crowell, where the agency in question could issue only
narrow, highly specialized factual determinations related to
particularized areas of law, the Act conferred upon bankruptcy
adjuncts the ability to hear all civil cases "arising under or related
to . . . title [sic] 1 L."'" Furthermore, and again unlike Crowell, the
Article I bankruptcy judges did not merely perform a fact-finding
function under the Act.140 Instead, they performed the same
function that the Article III district court judges would be expected
to perform.14 ' This administrative power included "all ordinary
powers of district courts."l4 2 Additional factors militated heavily
against constitutionality: namely, the deferential "clearly
erroneous" standard reserved for bankruptcy findings under the
Act and the finality of the bankruptcy adjunct's order-absent an
appeal, the adjunct's findings on, e.g., matters of law were subject
to enforcement.143 In light of this broad delegation of power, the
bankruptcy adjuncts were not really adjuncts at all; instead, they
were operating as Article III judges.'4 4 As such, the broad grant of
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts by Congress was
unconstitutional per the separation of powers principles inherent in
Article III.1'4
Justice Rehnquist, in a concurrence joined by Justice
O'Connor, identified a reluctance to decide the "broad question" of
"' Id. at 87.
139 Id. at 85 (citation omitted). This is very different from modem-day
bankruptcy court, which issues judgments of, e.g., invalidity on patents covering
highly complex and esoteric brands of technology.
140 id.
14 1 id.
142 Id. Inherent in this power was the ability to issue declaratory judgments
under§ 2201. Id.
143 Id. at 85-86.
'"See id. at 86.
"' See id. at 87. It is worth noting that the Court stayed its judgment so as to
allow Congress the opportunity to bring the statute in line with the requirements
of the Constitution. Id. at 88.
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constitutionality implicated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.146
Instead, he argued that the Court's analysis should be restricted
solely to the claims at issue in the litigation, i.e., breach of contract
and the like.'4 7 This principle should be adhered to particularly
when adjudicating issues related to Article III, given its "frequently
arcane distinctions and confusing precedents."' 8 However, Justice
Rehnquist remarked that claims in the lawsuit before the Court
"are the stuff of . . . common law."'49 Given that there were only
state-based actions of common law, and further given that the
federal rule did not provide for any of the issues in the law suit,
adjudication of Northern Pipeline's claims could not be sustained
under Article III.' Justice Rehnquist also agreed with the
plurality's conclusion that the bankruptcy court does not in fact
operate as a true adjunct of either the district court of the court of
appeals.'5 '
Justice Rehnquist thus concluded that the elements of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 enabling the Bankruptcy Court to hear the
claims alleged in the Northern Pipeline lawsuit were
146 Id. at 89.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 90.
149 Id. Further, Justice Rehnquist comments that "[t]he lawsuit is before the
Bankruptcy Court only because the plaintiff has previously filed a petition for
reorganization." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, but for the petition for
reorganization, the common law claims would not be before the bankruptcy
adjunct. This statement, though indirect, in essence comports with the
plurality's sentiment that a "related to" provision implicates an impermissibly
broad spectrum of law under the Constitution. See id. at 73-74. At least with
respect to the claims before the Court, the concurring Justices agreed that this
was an unconstitutional grant of Article III power to an adjunct. Id. at 91-92.
Justice Rehnquist additionally remarked that the claims were entirely state-based
in nature; this characterization was utilized as a means for identifying the
unconstitutionality of a non-Article Ill delegation. Id. at 90. Thus, the
concurrence shares many similarities with the plurality, as well as with prior
decisions on the subject. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
' N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90-91. With respect to the public rights analysis,
the concurrence merely remarks that "I am satisfied that the adjudication of
Northern's lawsuit cannot be so sustained" under the public rights exception. Id.
at 91.
'' Id.
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unconstitutional as violative of Article 111.152 Interestingly, Justice
Rehnquist expressly stated, "I agree with the plurality that this
grant of authority is not readily severable from the remaining grant
of authority to bankruptcy courts."' 3 Thus, while calling for a
restrictive, claim-based, idiosyncratic approach with respect to the
Court's analysis of Article III matters, the concurrence also
unequivocally joins with the plurality that the entirety of the grant
of power under the Act is inherently unconstitutional. Given the
reasons stated in the concurring opinion regarding the
unconstitutionality of the provision, it is not clear how the opinion
meaningfully departs from that of the plurality.154
G. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff " is a highly important case
inasmuch as it represents the Federal Circuit's first attempt to
reconcile McCormick,"' as it relates to patent invalidity, with later
decisions dealing with the public rights exception.' The Federal
Circuit in Patlex was charged with determining, inter alia, whether
certain provisions of the reexamination statute violated the Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury, as well as the bounds of Article
111.158 In light of McCormick, Article III was implicated due to the
fact that the reexamination procedure before an Article I patent
152 id
153 Id. at 91-92.
154 Id. at 90-91 (stating that the provision was unconstitutional because the
claims were based in common law and did not originate from federal rule; the
bankruptcy judges were not true adjuncts; the "related to" provision was
problematic; and the public rights exception did not apply). Later decisions
appear to identify these commonalities and many treat the plurality's opinion as
controlling law. See, e.g., Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Note, however, that Justice Rehnquist does disclaim several aspects of the
plurality's opinion: "I need not decide whether these cases in fact support a
general proposition and three tidy exceptions, as the plurality believes ... ." N.
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91.
' 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
156 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman-Miller Co., 169 U.S. 606
(1898).
's? Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604.
I1d. at 596.
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examiner carries implications regarding validity for an otherwise-
issued patent.'
The Federal Circuit began its analysis of the constitutionality
of the reexamination provision by stating that "[t]he fundamental
questions are: Did Gould have vested property . . . interests which
are protected by . . . the Seventh Amendment, or Article III,
against the retrospective effect of patent reexamination?"'60 In
answering these questions, the Federal Circuit adopted a form of
analysis focusing on the nature of the property interests at issue.''
It is without question, the Federal Circuit readily admitted, that
patents are property.'6 2 Furthermore, patents for inventions are not
merely property in a definitional sense, but are "as much property
as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation and is
surrounded and protected by the same sanctions."l63 Thus,
according to the Federal Circuit, patents fall wholly within
traditional definitions of protectable property." Inherent to these
traditional definitions is the applicability of both Article III and the
Seventh Amendment.
With respect to the reexamination statute itself, the Federal
Circuit remarked that it was enacted with the important goal of
allowing the Patent and Trademark Office to recapture
administrative jurisdiction over an issued patent "in order to
remedy any defects in the examination .. . which led to the grant of
'9 Id. at 597 ("Under 35 U.S.C. § 301, any person may call to the PTO's
attention prior art that may have a bearing on the patentability of any claim. On
the basis of that prior art, § 302 provides that any person may request the PTO to
reexamine any claim of the patent . . . [u]pon reexamination the PTO may
confirm any patentable claim or cancel any unpatentable claim .... ").
MId. at 598 (emphasis added). Note that the linchpin to the Federal Circuit's
analysis is whether there is a vested property interest. Id. This implies that,
where there has been a vested property interest that has historically been
guarded by various constitutional protections, any adjudication regarding that
interest by an Article I tribunal is unconstitutional.
161 See id. at 598-99.
162 Id. at 599.
163 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Consol. Fruit Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92,
96(1876)).
16 Id.
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the patent."1 65 This, according to the court, serves an important
public purpose of increasing the dependability of the patent
system.166 Prior to the enactment of the reexamination statute, new
questions of patentability rested within the sole purview of Article
III courts. Now, the Federal Circuit reasoned, private entities have
a cheaper, quicker, and more convenient way of remedying
"defects in the examination" process. 6 7 Such measures enhance, in
part, investor confidence with respect to patent rights and the
like. 168
The Federal Circuit, in addressing the constitutionality of
reexamination, repeatedly demonstrated the remedial tenor of the
statute: in pertinent part, "the reexamination statute . . . [is] of the
class of 'curative' statutes, designed to cure defects in an
administrative system," and "[t]he legislative history of the
reexamination statute makes clear that its purpose is to cure defects
in administrative agency action . . . and to remedy perceived
shortcomings in the system by which patents are issued."'' The
remedial nature of the statute, the court surmised, is indicative of
the congressional purpose underlying its enactment."' This
purpose plays an important role in the Federal Circuit's analysis of
the public rights doctrine.' 7
The Federal Circuit acknowledged McCormick and confirmed
its holding that "an issued patent [can] not be set aside other than
165 Id. at 601 (emphasis added). This is a critical element of the court's
analysis, and it factors heavily into the public rights calculus. Id. The chief
governmental purpose underlying the enactment of the statute is thus mistake-
based; in other words, according to the Federal Circuit, the reexamination statute
exists to allow the recapture of administrative jurisdiction solely where a
mistake has been committed. Id. The definition of "governmental mistake," as
well as the ramifications of this analysis, is discussed infra Part II.K.
166 Id.
167 See id.
161 Id. at 602 ("[R]examination would reinforce 'investor confidence in the
certainty of patent rights' by affording the PTO a broader opportunity to review
'doubtful patents.' " (citation omitted)).
1 Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
170 Id.
'7' id.
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by an Article III court."' 72 The court further acknowledged
Northern Pipeline, and remarked that it established the
unconstitutionality of shifting "rights that traditionally had been
adjudicated in Article III courts . . . to Article I courts.""
Certainly, then, in light of the Federal Circuit's "patents as
property" analysis, and its concession that Article III is
traditionally applicable,'74 there cannot be shifting on this basis.
However, the court identified that, under Northern Pipeline, there
are certain "public rights" that exist between the government and
others."' Where such public rights are present, Northern Pipeline
demonstrated that they may be adjudicated by legislative courts.'76
The Federal Circuit then sought to determine whether the matter of
patent validity fell within the bounds of the public rights exception.
The Federal Circuit, in its analysis of the public rights
exception, acknowledged that questions of patent invalidity are
generally brought between private parties."' Private rights, the
court conceded, obviously exist separately from public rights, and
are appropriately adjudicated before Article III courts."'
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit adopted the plurality's restrictive
definition of public rights from Northern Pipeline as its own:
"[t]he Court observed that 'a matter of public rights must at a
minimum arise 'between the government and others.' ""' Thus,
the Federal Circuit placed itself in the unique situation of
rationalizing how a dispute between private parties meets
Crowell's restrictive requirement that the government be a party.'80
172 Id. at 604.
'73 Id.
174 Id.
1' Id. (citation omitted).
76 Id. (citation omitted).
177 id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 604 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458
U.S. 50, 69-70 (1982) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932))).
I80 Recall that Crowell allowed, where only private parties were implicated, a
limited fact-finding function by an Article I adjunct Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
Note that this is not the case where an examiner, during reexamination, can
render issued claims invalid. Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604. Thus, the Federal Circuit
is essentially stuck harmonizing a lawsuit between private parties with a
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In order to bridge this perceived gap, the Federal Circuit
established that "the grant of a valid patent is primarily a public
concern." 181 Though disputes regarding patent validity usually
occur between private parties, the threshold issue is whether the
examiner, under the authority granted to her by Congress, properly
issued the patent. 8 2 More directly, the Federal Circuit declared
that in a patent validity action between private parties, what really
is "[a]t issue is a right that can only be conferred by the
government."'83 Most importantly, the court was careful to
distinguish its holding from McCormick. According to the Federal
Circuit, the reexamination statute passes constitutional muster
simply because the statute itself is purposed "to correct errors
made by the government, to remedy defective governmental (not
private) action."' 84 Thus, though McCormick, which is Supreme
Court precedent, guarantees the resolution of validity disputes
before an Article III tribunal, the Federal Circuit carved out a
narrow exception to this holding under the public rights doctrine of
Crowell. Specifically, where the purpose of an invalidity
contention is to resolve an error or mistake committed by the
Patent and Trademark Office, then it is, according to the Federal
Circuit, a matter of "public rights" and thus amenable to
adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal.'
The Patlex standard for the applicability of public rights to
patent validity deserves additional discussion. At the heart of the
standard is this concept of correction of errors by the government.
However, any patent issued by the government but later found to
be invalid-either before an Article I or Article III tribunal-is
ostensibly representative of an error made by the government. The
standard that requires the presence of government. Id. (noting that this right is
one "that can only be conferred by the government" (citation omitted)).
181 id.
182 id.
183 Id. (citation omitted).
I84 Id.
185 See id. It is worth noting that the court does not address the Seventh
Amendment right directly. Instead, this right is simply lumped in with its
Article III analysis and dismissed of summarily. Given that a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial is, as discussed, inherent to a suit at common
law, public rights necessarily cannot apply.
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determination of this is holistically dependent upon how "error" is
defined, and the Federal Circuit declines to provide a delineating
definition. If error is interpreted broadly, and any invalid patent
represents a mistake made by the government, then McCormick is
overruled in its entirety. A decision that reserves invalidity
determinations to the sole authority of Article III tribunals cannot
be reconciled with a decision that allows, under the public rights
exception, any Article I determination of the same validity where
an "error"-the allegation of invalidity in the first place evidencing
the governmental mistake-has been made. Such logic not merely
threatens McCormick, but obliterates it completely. Thus, the
holding of Patlex must be read in light of McCormick.
In order to reconcile the two cases, the holding of Patlex
becomes necessarily narrow. Patlex must apply to the
reexamination procedure before the Patent and Trademark Office
only. Furthermore, the procedure only allows for the remedy of
government mistakes. Errors beyond this, such as errors
committed by the inventor, rest securely within the grasp of Article
III tribunals."' After Patlex, however, questions regarding the
scope of public rights exception remain. Later decisions by the
Federal Circuit, such as Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck,'" call
into question whether the Federal Circuit appreciates the
necessarily narrow nature of public rights exception as applied to
patents in light of controlling Supreme Court precedent. Later
portions of this Article will evaluate the Federal Circuit's position,
and will further reconcile it with the Supreme Court's law.
Importantly, the applicability of public rights and patents to Article
I courts will be evaluated.
H. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.
Thomas marks the Court's temporary departure from Crowell's
strict interpretation of the public rights exception.'" In Thomas,
186 See McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman Co., 169 U.S. 606,
609-10 (1898).
" 952 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1992).
188 See generally Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985). Schor, also written by Justice O'Connor, falls inline with the analysis
espoused in Thomas. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
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the Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, where the Act
provided for binding arbitration with only limited possible judicial
review as part of its pesticide scheme.'89
A party subject to a binding, unfavorable decision from an
arbiter alleged, inter alia, that the congressional grant of
jurisdiction to the Article I arbitrator was an unconstitutional
violation of the territory otherwise reserved for the judiciary under
Article III.190 The Court, in responding to this question of
constitutionality, immediately remarked upon the commonplace
nature of the procedural aspects of the Act."' Specifically, the Act
was generally homologous with others that had passed
constitutional muster; agency action is routinely employed to aid in
the resolution of factual disputes between private parties. The
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). Later Supreme Court cases, however, tend to
gravitate away from O'Connor's expansive approach to the public rights
doctrine, reaffirming the importance of Crowell. See generally Granfinanciera
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
'89 See generally Thomas, 473 U.S. 568. In order to streamline the approval
of various pesticides, the Act permitted data sharing amongst various applicants.
Id. at 571. Data sharing applied where the pesticide product in question was the
same or similar. Id. at 572. The statutory scheme not only provided for a
sharing of submitted data, but also for a remuneration scheme where one
applicant shouldered the initial, financial burden of original data generation. Id.
The amount of compensation for the data generation was to be negotiated by the
parties. Id. In the event that negotiations broke down, the binding arbitration
then took place before the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. Such
determinations were subject to limited judicial review. Id.
190 At the outset of its analysis, the Court laments that the jurisprudence
underlying the public rights analysis was hardly the model of clarity; "[a]n
absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this area of 'frequently
arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.' " Id. at 583 (quoting N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)).
191 "Many matters that involve the application of legal standards to facts and
affect private interests are routinely decided by agency action with limited or no
review by Article III courts." Id. at 583. This statement is vague. The
declaration regarding "the application of legal standards" implies the Court's
prior ratification of adjudication of legal matters by Article I tribunals between
private parties. See id The Court in Thomas, however, makes no effort to
reconcile statements of this variety with Crowell, which expressly reserved for
Article I bodies a highly limited fact-finding function where wholly private
entities were involved. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89 (1932).
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Court was quick to point out that there was no majority opinion in
Northern Pipeline.19 2 Instead, the plurality's opinion must be read
in light of Justice Rehnquist's concurrence. Applying the most
restrictive elements of the concurrence to the plurality's opinion in
Northern Pipeline, the Court in Thomas concluded that Northern
Pipeline merely stood for the limited proposition that "Congress
may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate ...
in a traditional contract action arising under state law."'93 Thus,
given that the Act in Thomas was federal in nature, Northern
Pipeline did not apply.'94
Still, the Court expended considerable effort addressing the
public versus private rights dichotomy espoused in Northern
Pipeline."' Though the plurality in Northern Pipeline, relying on
Crowell, remarked that a public right is a right that exists between
the government and those subject to its authority, the Court
expressly disclaimed any requirement that the Federal Government
be a party of record in order for public rights to be implicated.'96
Conversely, and by the same logic, the Court held that Article III is
not necessarily diminished where the government is a party.
Instead, the analysis is one not of the parties involved, but instead
of the substance of the claims at issue.'" Though the Court
192 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583.
193 Id. at 584 (emphasis added). As mere matter of note, not all courts have
adopted such a strict interpretation of Northern Pipeline. In, e.g., Patlex, the
Federal Circuit identified the plurality's opinion, in light of the Court's prior
precedent, as indicative of the state of the law on the public rights exception,
and, further, generally emblematic of import of Northern Pipeline. See Patlex
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Justice O'Connor for
the majority in Thomas disagreed with the Federal Circuit's view. Thomas, 473
U.S. at 584. The concurrence of Justices Brennan and Stevens stated that
"[b]ecause the approach of the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline is
sufficiently flexible . . . I adhere to it." Id. at 600 (Brennan, J., Stevens, J.,
concurring).
194 Thomas, 472 U.S. at 600.
195 Recall that approach with respect to public rights utilized by the majority
in Northern Pipeline was highly duplicative of what the Court set forth in
Crowell. See supra Part II.F.
196 See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585-86.
197 Id. at 586. The Court cited Crowell for this proposition. Thus, we have
seen examples of where Crowell has been cited on both sides of the public rights
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pointed to Crowell for support of this statement of law, it chose to
ignore Crowell's command that, where private parties are
involved, the role of the Article I participant is restricted to that of
a fact-finding adjunct.'" Instead, "[t]he enduring lesson of Crowell
is that practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire
reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article
III."' Specifically, where Congress has selected a quasi-judicial
method for the determination of rights that can, under the
Constitution, be conclusively resolved by either the executive or
legislative branches, then the public rights exception applies.200
Applying its analysis of the public rights exception to the Act,
the Court identified several aspects of the Act that save it from
contravening Article III. Firstly, and most importantly, the origins
of the right itself are wholly congressional in nature. As such,
significant discretion rests with Congress as to the resolution of
perceived wrongs stemming from the legislative right. This
analysis closely mirrors that of, e.g., Crowell. However, the Court
in Thomas takes it a step further. The right at issue more closely
coin. In light of the origin-based analysis of Thomas, recall McCormick.
Furthermore, recall the statements in Patlex regarding the property rights
inherent to patents. Is it without question that property disputes-including
allegations of patent invalidity-are traditionally the sort of "substance"
reserved for Article Ill courts. Compare against Patlex, which declared that
because the patent right is fundamentally governmental in nature, and the
purpose of reexamination is to cure a government mistake, the reexamination
statute was not an unconstitutional conferral of Article Ill power. Given the
disparity in the approaches, and extremely narrow nature of Patlex, it is unclear
what relevance, if any, Patlex holds for patent invalidity before, e.g., an Article I
bankruptcy tribunal. In one instance, private parties are consenting to
government jurisdiction to remedy a government mistake before an expert
government patent administrator. On the other, private parties are litigating
property rights exclusively reserved for Article III resolution before a non-expert
Article I bankruptcy court.
198 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932).
199 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587.
2 0 0 d. at 589. Though previously limiting the holding of Northern Pipeline to
the more restrictive aspects of Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, for this
important statement as to what the public rights doctrine generally entails,
Justice O'Connor, maybe somewhat paradoxically, cites to the plurality's
opinion. Id. This reflects a sentiment that while Northern Pipeline was correct
in some respects, other aspects were deserving of a clear carve-out.
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resembles a public right-as opposed to a private right-in that it
serves a public purpose, i.e. in this particular instance safeguarding
public health.201' Given that the Act serves this important public
purpose, it is within the permissible scope of congressional power
to assign cost-sharing determinations regarding pesticide
obligations amongst voluntary participants to a non-Article III
administrator.202 Though the voluntary aspect of the parties'
participation certainly factors into the public rights calculus in
Thomas, the Court pinpoints on numerous occasions the
importance of the public purpose at stake. Specifically, because
the Act entails a "potentially dangerous product" that may directly
endanger the "public health," the use of Article I binding
arbitration passes constitutional muster.20 3
201 It is interesting that Crowell as well as the plurality's opinion of Northern
Pipeline were cited to in the construction of the Court's opinion, and yet the
mode of public rights analysis in Thomas breaks down, in part, to whether a
"public purpose" is served. It is unclear how the restrictive nature of, e.g.,
Crowell comports with this chosen standard. It is worth noting, however, that
the Federal Circuit's public rights analysis in Patlex does tend to mirror, at least
in this regard, the analysis utilized in Thomas. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,
758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Consider the holding of Thomas against
later Supreme Court decisions. This expansive view of public rights does not
appear to survive further rounds of judicial scrutiny. Later decisions such as,
e.g., Stern, tend to return to the more preclusive aspects of Crowell.
202 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589. The importance of the use of the "voluntary"
criterion in Thomas cannot be understated. However, there are serious questions
regarding the legitimacy of Article III waiver by a private litigant.
203 Id. at 590. Thus according to the Court in Thomas, the public rights
analysis is two-fold. Firstly, and most importantly, is the nature of the right at
issue-does the right fall within the strict purview of, e.g., legislative creation
and determination? Secondly, the concerns underlying the enactment of the act
in question apply to the public rights determination. As Thomas demonstrates,
where the public purpose served is important, a finding of "public rights" is
more likely. The vitality of this second prong, however, post-Granfinanciera
and Stern is questionable (not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor, despite authoring
both Thomas and Schor, dissents in Granfinanciera). See Granfinanciera v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 72 (1989). As suggested above, a public rights prong
that allows for consideration of public purpose is problematic in that it
significantly muddles the bounds of Article III. Ostensibly, any statute as
enacted by the Federal Government embodies some form of critically important
issue. If this is the litmus, then the integrity of Article III's mandate erodes
significantly. Later decisions by the Court appear to recognize the import of
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In concluding that the Act was constitutional under the two-
pronged analysis discussed above, the Court made the curious
decision of quoting the passage from Crowell that unequivocally
limited the role of the adjunct, where the rights of private parties
were involved, 204 to a restricted fact-finding function subject to
judicial review; "[t]o hold otherwise would be to defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a ... method for
dealing with a class of questions offact which are peculiarly suited
to examination and determination by an administrative agency
specially assigned."205 In a case where an Article I adjunct, with
the power to issue binding decisions, is granted the power to apply
legal standards to a dispute arising strictly between private parties,
it is unclear how the quoted, narrow limitation of Crowell
comports with the Court's holding. Also curiously, the Court in
Thomas again cited to Crowell for its conclusion that the judicial
standard of review provided for under the Act was adequate per the
requirements of Article 111.206 Crowell, however, provided that
where an adjunct was charged with resolving questions of fact,
constitutionality was preserved to the extent that the supervising
court maintained de novo reviewing authority to either reconsider
any relevant evidence, or where the provided evidence was found
lacking, ask for additional production. 2 07  Here, fundamentally
distinct from Crowell, the limited standard of review reserved for
Article III tribunals did not extend past an evaluation of fraud,
misconduct, or misrepresentation. 208  This standard not only
subtle diminishment: "We cannot compromise the integrity of the system of
separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system, even with respect
to challenges that may seem innocuous at first blush." Stem v. Marshall, 131
S.Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
204 This distinction, for the purpose of comparing with Crowell, assumes that
the inclusion of private parties does not implicate any newly-formulated public
purpose analysis.
205 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added) (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)). It is unclear how the "application of legal standards"
can be reconciled with Crowell's strict proclamation regarding "questions of
fact."
206 Id. at 592.
207 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 65.208 See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592.
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applied to the resolution of questions of fact in disputes between
private parties, but also the application of standards of law.209 The
standards, as such, are wholly distinct.210
I. Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor
The opinion of the Court in Commodity Future Trading
Commission v. Schor,2 1 1 like Thomas, was delivered by Justice
O'Connor. Not surprising, then, is the fact that public rights
espoused in Schor mirror, in many respects, the Court's analysis in
Thomas. At issue in Schor was whether the Commodity Exchange
Act, which allowed for the adjudication of state law counterclaims
by an Article I authority, represented an unconstitutional grant of
Article III judicial authority. 212 Specifically, the Act provided for a
reparations procedure before the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) that was dedicated to the resolution of
disputes between customers and commodity brokers where the
209 It is important to highlight the discrepancies between what the Court in
Thomas held and what the Crowell Court established as law with respect to the
public rights exception, the Court's citations notwithstanding. As mentioned
previously, later decisions by the Court returned to a more literal reading of
Crowell. Thomas can thus be viewed as the Court's attempt, albeit temporary,
to broaden the applicability to the public rights exception, presumably in the
interests of preserving, at least in part, judicial economy. The Court's
discussion of "public purpose" tends to support this. Furthermore, that consent
of the parties factored so heavily into the Court's analysis, lends additional
weight to this determination. See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 592.
210 Still, the controlling standard expressed by the Court in Thomas is
importantly honest with respect to its treatment of Crowell. In Thomas, as seen
elsewhere, the determination of the nature of the right itself is the chief
determinant; i.e. where rights are, e.g., wholly legislative in nature, and are
subject to complete congressional discretion, they appropriately fall within the
public rights exception. This foundational theme is the linchpin of Thomas, and
appears to be one of the few unifying elements prevailing through the Court's
Article Ill jurisprudence. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855). Compare this standard to
McCormick and its holding regarding the applicability of patent validity to
Article III. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609
(1897).
211 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
212 Id. at 835-36.
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broker was alleged to have violated elements of the Act.213
Pursuant to its goal of providing a means for efficacious resolution
before the Commission, Congress included a catch-all provision
"which allows it to adjudicate counterclaims '[arising] out of the
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences
set forth in the complaint.' "214 Thus, under this broad catch-all
counterclaim provision, a litany of various claims tangential to the
chief alleged broker violation could come before the
Commission.2 15
At the outset of its analysis of the constitutionality of the Act,
the Court was clear to establish that, by the terms of the
counterclaim provision, a counterclaim in the usual case will arise
out of the same course of events as the primary claim and generally
requires resolution of the same factual disputes.216 Still, the Court
had to consider the constitutionality of a provision that granted
Article I jurisdiction over common law counterclaims. 2 17  As in
213 Id. at 836.
214 Id. at 837 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 3994, 3995, 4002 (1976)). It is worth
noting that there are substantial similarities between the counterclaim catch-all
provisions found in both Schor and Stern.
215 In Schor, a former client alleged that a particular commodity futures
broker, who had overseen a client's account with extensive net futures trading
losses, had violated the terms of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. The broker,
through a diversity action, filed a separate suit to recover the debit balance
remaining on the aforementioned account. Id. The broker then dismissed the
federal diversity action, and presented its debit balance claim through the catch-
all counterclaim provision to the Commission. Id. at 837-38. The Article I
judge, hearing the merits of the case, ruled in favor of the broker on both the
claims and counterclaims. Id. at 838. Upon receiving the adverse ruling, the
former client, for the first time, raised challenges regarding the constitutionality
of the Commission's jurisdiction over the catch-all counterclaim provision. Id
In essence, the client now argued that the counterclaim provision enabled an
impermissible allocation of Article III judicial power to an Article I commission.
216 Id. at 843. This is an important limitation. Here, the Court is preserving
the constitutionality of a broad counterclaim provision that allows for
counterclaims that are necessarily resolved by adjudication upon the primary
claim. Compare against, e.g., the resolution of a patent validity claim in a
bankruptcy proceeding.
217 Again, the Court highlights the complex nature of the jurisprudence
surrounding Article III; "[O]ur precedents in this area do not admit of easy
synthesis . . ." Id. at 847.
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Thomas, the Court declared that it is the substance of the matter
that controls the Article III determination; "doctrinaire reliance on
formal categories should [not] inform application of Article III."1218
Where purely private litigants are involved, however, the analysis
under Article III becomes more complicated. 219 Because the client
selected the Commission as the appropriate venue for seeking
relief regarding the violations under the Act, there was an effective
waiver of any constitutional safeguards otherwise provided for
under Article 111.220
218 Id. at 848.
219 Id. Interestingly, the Court, for the first time, directly addresses the
concept of waiver. Specifically, Justice O'Connor remarks that, where private
parties are involved, the guarantees of Article III with respect to an "impartial
and independent federal adjudication" are subject to the same waiver applicable
to any other constitutional right. Id. In support of this position, Justice
O'Connor cites to waiver in the context of jury trial, both criminal and civil, and
the waiver of trial altogether by virtue of the guilty plea. Id. at 849 (citing
Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238 (1969)); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
158 (1968); FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d). It is important to remain mindful of the
distinction that Justice O'Connor is drawing here; she is not claiming that the
requirement of Article III dictating separation of powers concerns is subject to
waiver. Instead, "the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be
tried" are subject to waiver. Schor, 478 U.S. at 849-50 (emphasis added). Thus
in actuality, the Court's discussion has little to do with separation of powers at
all. Later decisions tend to confuse the role of waiver in an Article III
framework. See, e.g., Stem v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011). This concept of
waiver with respect to Article III, and the incorrect notion that the Constitution
allows a private litigant to waive important, institutional safeguards regarding
the separation of powers, is discussed infra Part 11.1.
220 Schor, 478 U.S. at 850. In the context of waiver, the Court further
discusses that the client had the opportunity to first resolve the counterclaim in
an Article III court. Id. Though the client filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim before the Federal District Court on the basis that it was, e.g.,
wasteful of judicial resources given the action pending before the Commission,
the motion was ultimately denied by the District Court. It was the broker who
voluntarily agreed to the dismissal of the claim before the Article III court. As
such, it is unclear how the client truly consented to the Commission's
jurisdiction over the counterclaim when it was not the direct action of the client
that resulted in Commission's resolution of the debt claim. Following the
course of action, it was the broker, and not the client, who consented to the
jurisdiction of the Commission. This fact, left unacknowledged by the Court,
turns the consent analysis on its head.
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Such safeguards, however, did not include fundamental
constitutional distinctions in terms of what an Article I tribunal
may or may not try. Where the boundaries of Article III are
implicated, the Court surmised, "the parties cannot by consent cure
the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by
consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction
beyond the limitations imposed by Article III."1221 Thus, after
expending considerable effort remarking upon the importance of
waiver in the context of procedural safeguards, the Court
unequivocally declares that "[w]hen these Article III limitations
are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive
because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties
cannot be expected to protect."2 2 2 The determination for the Court
is not whether there has been waiver, but instead whether a
congressional delegation of responsibility has threatened the
institutional autonomy of the Judicial Branch.
According to the Court in Schor, there are four key factors that
merit consideration in the context of the Article III analysis. The
four factors are: (1) the extent to which the essential attributes of
judicial power are reserved for Article III courts; (2) the extent to
which the Article I tribunal exercises power normally reserved for
Article III courts; (3) the "origins and importance" of the right in
question; 2 3 and (4) the concerns that motivated Congress to depart
from Article III in the first place.224 Applying these factors, the
221 Id. at 851.
222 Id. Thus, the jurisdictional bounds of Article III are not subject to waiver.
Matters of procedure, more appropriately catalogued under Due Process, are.
Consider the context of Bankruptcy Court: If consent and waiver cannot save
the constitutionality of subject matter reserved to Article III courts under the
Constitution, on what basis can the Article I Bankruptcy Court hear, for
example, an argument deciding patent validity?
223 Id. (emphasis added). Note that here the Court is adding a consideration
regarding the "importance" of the right. An analysis considering the perceived
importance of an asserted right was not present in prior decisions regarding the
same. In some respects, this represents a step beyond the "purpose"-based
analysis espoused in Thomas. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985).
224 Compare against Thomas. Without question, Schor represents a further
broadening of the public rights exception. Not only should a court consider the
origins of the right and the purpose of the Act, but highly subjective elements
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Court conceded that the Act departed from traditional models in
that it granted ancillary jurisdiction over state law counterclaims.225
However, given that the counterclaims necessarily arose from the
same transaction, they are not unconstitutional.2 26 Still, the Court
was careful to hedge, and stated "wholesale importation of
concepts of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction into the agency
context may create greater constitutional difficulties."22 7 In
applying factor one, the Court remarked that the Commission
under the CEA left considerably more of the essential attributes of
judicial power to Article III courts than the invalid bankruptcy
provision did under Northern.2 28 This was achieved primarily
because the expert Commission in Schor was charged with
resolving a highly particularized area of law, whereas the
bankruptcy provision allowed a broad range of civil proceedings
under its catch-all provision.2 Further in line with, e.g., Crowell,
the Commission's orders under the Act were only enforceable by
direct order of the supervising District Court.230 Additionally, the
District Court in Schor reserved the same standard of review over
Commission determinations as seen in Crowell.23' All legal
determinations made by the Commission were subject to de novo
review at the district court level.232 Furthermore, the Commission
did not possess the same powers as the district courts; the Act
such as "importance" and Congressional motivation must be analyzed as well.
Under this rubric, the bounds of Article III become further diluted. It is worth
noting that the Court articulated these prongs in the context of a dispute arising
between private litigants. Compare with Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)
and the strict parameters the Court established for the role of the Article I
adjunct in that case.
225 Schor, 478 U.S. at 852.
22 6 Id. (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966)).
227 Id.
228 id
229 Id. (citing Crowell, 285 U.S. 22).
2 30 Id. at 853.
231 Id. Compare against the more deferential standard found in Northern
Pipeline. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68
(1982). Compare further against the standard currently existing today for
bankruptcy determinations. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2603-04
(2011).
232 Schor, 478 U.S. at 583.
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provided for limitations in terms of the Commission's ability to,
e.g., preside over jury trials. 233  Thus, in the Court's estimation,
prong two was satisfied as well.
With respect to the third prong, the Court admitted that given
that the counterclaim was a private right founded in state law, it
was of the variety that is generally reserved for Article III
determination.234 Still, the client's primary claim, despite being
private in nature, was susceptible to conclusive determination by
either the executive or legislative branches. As such, Congress had
considerable discretion in terms of how it framed the resolution of
such a claim. Under the Act, Congress enabled the Commission,
subject to the limitations discussed above, to issue findings. That
Congress provided for a catch-all counterclaim provision that
granted the Commission jurisdiction "over a narrow class of
common law claims as an incident to the CFTC's primary, and
unchallenged adjudicative function" does not set to undermine
separation of powers.235 Importantly, this allocation of
administrative power did not usurp judicial function.2 36 Instead,
the decision to invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission rested
wholly with the parties237 and as such, the parties had consented to
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 854. Inherent to this statement, as discussed previously, is that the
"narrow class" arises under ancillary jurisdiction standards. Specifically, the
issue on counterclaim must arise under the same transaction or occurrence. This
is further viewed against the backdrop of the limitations already discussed, i.e.
the expert nature of the tribunal, the de novo standard of review, the non-binding
nature of the decisions, etc.
236 id
237 Id. at 855. Here, the concept of consent appears to once again become
muddled. In Schor, the Court expressly disclaimed consent as a method of
curing constitutional defects with respect to Congressional allocation of power
under Article 1II. Id. Consent applied only in the context of the disavowal of
procedural safeguards. But in reading Schor, Justice O'Connor first articulates
that because the private right under state common law arises from the same
transaction as the primary claim, it is constitutional; furthermore, the parties
consented to adjudication by the Commission. In light of the Court's direct
proclamations on the subject, it is unclear how consent -then factors into the
Article III analysis in the first place, or why it is cited in support of the Court's
assertion regarding ancillary jurisdiction. Additionally, the Court in Schor
330 [VOL. 13: 287
Patents and Public Rights
the resolution of claims-both primary and ancillary-before the
Article I tribunal.
Thus, Schor primarily breaks down into two important
categories: on the one hand, the counterclaim arises from the same
transaction or occurrence as the constitutionally-permissible
Article I claim and thus, according to the guiding principles of
ancillary jurisdiction, comes in under the framework of the expert
Article I tribunal, and on the other, because the parties
consented-though consent technically only applies in a
procedural context-the resolution of the common law claim,
much like where a private arbitrator becomes involved, is further
saved from unconstitutionality. In many respects, this decision is
confusing. It establishes one standard (e.g. consent),238 and yet
ignores it in the same breath.239 Recognizable standards appear
from prior decisions on the subject: expertise of tribunal, standard
of review, judicial review; only to be comingled with additional,
borderline haphazard ideas that generally lack clear definition:
congressional purpose, congressional plan, demonstrated need,
alternative forums, and consent.240 And as with Thomas, Justice
analogizes between the function of the Commission and the utilization of an
arbitrator. Id. That private parties may consent to the use of a private arbitrator
has no bearing whatsoever on the constitutionality of a legislative act that grants
authority to a non-Article III tribunal to hear state common law counterclaims.
238 The Court in Schor established in unmistakable terms that waiver has no
bearing in terms of Article III separation of powers defects. Id. at 850.
239 Justice O'Connor writes "[t]his is not to say ... that if Congress created a
phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the
Article III courts . .. the fact that the parties had the election to proceed in their
forum of choice would necessarily save the scheme from constitutional attack."
Id. at 855. But if Article 111 is unassailable, and if its safeguards regarding the
power of the judiciary cannot be entrusted to private litigants in the first
instance, why does the Court expend energy discussing consent in the context of
its public rights analysis? The Court appears to be suggesting that consent is but
a factor in the overall scheme, even though, by the Court's own admission, it has
no bearing on the Article III analysis. The Court declines to reconcile these
competing themes, instead leaving it to the reader to discern what importance, if
any, the notion of waiver carries under the public rights rubric.
240 See id. Many of these additional considerations receive little to no
explanation or definition. Given the inherently nebulous character of some of
the criterion (e.g. demonstrated need), the bounds of Article III were further
undermined.
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O'Connor again cites to Crowell for the assertion that where
private parties are involved, the administrative adjunct serves as an
"expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of
questions of fact."2 4 1 But the Act does not provide for limited
determinations of fact; at issue, after all, was the determination of a
claim of state common law.
The Court concludes that "due regard must be given in each
case to the unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its
practical consequences" in terms of the Court's Article III analysis,
and thus, given the limited nature. of the grant, the Act is
constitutional.2 42 Given that the counterclaim arose under the same
transaction or occurrence giving rise to the primary, constitutional
claim, and further given that private parties at issue submitted,
voluntarily, the claim and counterclaim to a legislative tribunal for
adjudication, the Court did not identify any infirmities with respect
to the governing separation of powers principles.243
J. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,24 4 like Northern Pipeline, directly
addresses the constitutionality of congressional delegations of
power to the bankruptcy courts.245 Unlike Northern Pipeline,
however, the question in Granfinanciera was whether a party, who
had not submitted a claim against a bankruptcy estate, had a right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment when sued by the
241 Id. at 856 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932)).
242 Schor, 478 U.S. at 857 (emphasis added).
243 Id. Schor represents the Court's broadest reading of the public rights
exception. As discussed, many elements are thrown in with recognizable
portions of prior precedents, some explained and defined, some not. In many
respects, Granfinanciera represents a reaction to Schor, and its holding sought
to recapture some of the more fundamental aspects of Article III otherwise
eroded under Schor. As mentioned previously, Justice O'Connor-clearly a
strong advocate for an expansive reading for Article III-authored Thomas
(1985) and Schor (1986), but dissented in Granfinanciera (1989). That fact
alone speaks volumes about the direction of the Court regarding its public rights
jurisprudence.
244 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
245 See generally id 492 U.S. 33.
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trustee to recover damages for a fraudulent money transfer.24 6
Given that Congress had designated fraudulent conveyance actions
as core proceedings under the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, the
Court had to determine whether this express delegation of power to
an Article I tribunal trumped the constitutional right to a jury
trial.247
The fraudulent transfer claim was found, interestingly, not
under traditional common law, but instead under a federal
statute.248 The lower courts held that because the federal statutory
right did not include an express mention of a right to a jury trial,
the claim was properly before the Bankruptcy Court as a non-jury
issue. 249  Importantly-especially in regard to patent property
rights-the Court unequivocally disclaimed this mode of analysis
under the Seventh Amendment.250 Instead, the Court held that the
"Seventh Amendment also applies to actions brought to enforce
statutory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of
action ordinarily decided in English law courts." 251 Thus, though a
right may be derived wholly from federal statute, the right itself
may still be subject to, e.g., jury trial limitations where the
statutory right is analogous to traditional common law claims.
However, even if a particular right may be legal, and not equitable,
in nature, that right may still be divested of the jury trial obligation
under the Seventh Amendment where the right itself is a "public
246 Id. at 36.
247 Id. at 37 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (1982 ed., Supp. V)).
248 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. V)).
249 Id.250 Id. at 64 n.19.
251 Id. at 42 (emphasis added). The importance of jury trial rights under the
Seventh Amendment and their implication for the public rights analysis, as
applied to patents, is discussed infra Part II.F. As discussed in previous cases,
and in order to avoid confusion on the point, public rights may at times apply
where only private litigants are implicated. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982). In the same vein, though
modem patent rights are clearly derived from federal statute, decisions of this
nature demonstrate that the analysis does not stop there. Cases such as, e.g.,
McCormick demonstrate that patents for intellectual property share the same
rights and privileges as patents for land. See McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co.
v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898). The implications here regarding the
constitutionality of patents as public rights are also discussed infra Part I.F.
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right."252 Where "a cause of action is legal in nature and it involves
a matter of 'private right,' " the litigant's right to a jury trial is
preserved.253 In analyzing the applicability of the jury trial right to
the fraudulent conveyance action, the Court embarked on its usual
two-pronged analysis: First, the statutory action is compared to
eighteenth century actions brought in courts of England prior to the
merger of law and equity; second, the remedy itself is analyzed to
determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.254 Applying the
claim in question to the two-pronged analysis, the Court
concluded, in part, that the remedy sought is primarily legal in
nature.255 As such, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to
a jury trial with respect to the fraudulent conveyance claim.
Given that the remedy sought is legal in nature, and further
given that the right to a jury trial is preserved, the federal statutory
nature of the right notwithstanding, the Court sought to determine
whether the public rights exception saved the constitutionality of
the provision in question.256 Specifically, because the provision
labeled fraudulent conveyance actions as core proceedings, the
applicability of the jury trial right was necessarily blocked.257
Thus, the competing obligations could only be harmonized by
virtue of the application of the public rights exception.2 58 In
applying the public rights exception, the Court in Granfinanciera
immediately returned to the more restrictive views of the exception
252 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4.
253 Id. Recall Bakelite. There, the Court remarked that suits at common law
implicated the Seventh Amendment jury trial. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 453 (1929). Similarly, where a suit was at common law, there could
not be a public right. Id. Thus, where a jury trial right had been found
applicable by virtue of common law, the public rights analysis was necessarily
concluded as well.
254 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
255 The Court's complicated analysis of the perceived jury trial right under the
Seventh Amendment as applied, utilizing prongs one and two, to the fraudulent
conveyance action is not reproduced here. For detail regarding these arguments,
see id. at 42-49.256 Id. at 50.257 id.258 Id. at 51.
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articulated in both Atlas and Crowell.25 9 In applying Atlas, the
Granfinanciera Court at the outset established that administrative
fact-finding is only supported in situations implicating public
rights, i.e. "where the Government is involved in its sovereign
capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable
public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases ...
are not at all implicated."26 0
Further to Atlas, the Court cited to Crowell for its definition of
private rights.26 ' Thus, where private entities are involved in
common law disputes before a federal court, the right to a jury trial
is unassailable.2 62 Conversely, where public rights are involved,
i.e. rights that "arise between the Government and persons subject
to its authority in connection with [its] performance of the
constitutional functions,"263 Congress may assign their adjudication
to administrative tribunals with or without a constituent jury trial
right attached. On this distinction, the Court is unequivocal. The
issue of public rights, in the Court's estimation, is not merely one
of state law versus federal law; "[a]s we recognized in Atlas
Roofing, to hold otherwise would be to permit Congress to
259 Id. Note, however, that the Court does not embark on a wholesale
adoption of Atlas: "Our case law makes plain . .. that the class of 'public rights'
whose adjudication Congress may assign to administrative agencies or courts of
equity sitting without juries is more expansive than Atlas Roofing's discussion
suggests." Id. at 53 (remarking that the standard for the applicability of the
public rights exception is not merely one of whether the Federal government is
involved in its sovereign capacity).
260 Id. at 54 (emphasis added) (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458 (1977)). Here, we see
recitation of the requirement of government as a party. Id. at 51. Additionally,
the Court in Granfinanciera is careful to remark that fact-finding at the Article I
level is legitimized under the public rights exception. Id. Conspicuously absent
is mention of the application of legal standards by the administrative tribunal.
Further, the Court reestablishes that wholly private tort and property cases are
immunized from the public rights exception. Id. In many respects, the opinions
of the Court in Schor and Granfinanciera could not be any more disparate.
261 "In Crowell, we defined 'private right' as 'the liability of one individual to
another under the law as defined.' " Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51 n.8 (citing
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).262 Id. at 51 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450 n.7).
263 Id. at 50 n.8 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50).
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eviscerate the Seventh Amendment." 264 Instead, true public rights
can only "originate in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme"-to
the extent that the right has a "long line of common-law
forebears," the public rights exception cannot apply. 65
Interestingly, after remarking in the first portion of the case
that the public rights determination existed distinctly from the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial determination, the Court
appears to concede, as suggested in, e.g., Bakelite, that the modes
of analysis required for the Article III determination and the jury
trial right are not mutually exclusive. Instead, the Court admits
that "the question whether the Seventh Amendment permits
Congress to .assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not
employ juries . . . requires the same answer as the question whether
Article III allows Congress to assign adjudication ... . to a non-
Article III tribunal." 266  Given that the rights are intrinsically
linked, the Court remarked that it will "therefore rely on our
decisions exploring the restrictions [of] Article III . . . to determine
whether petitioners are entitled to a jury trial."267 Certainly, this
logic is reciprocal. Thus, where the Court has already established
that there is a jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment, the
cause of action in question cannot fall within the public rights
exception.268
The Court then chooses, however, to introduce another element
into the public rights analysis. Despite suggesting in prior
passages that it might return to "Government as a party" for its
public rights mode of determination, the Court conceded that the
264 Id. at 52 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 457-58).
265 Id. This holding can apply to patents. Without question, common law
property interests are implicated, even when considering that the patent dispute
originates from federal statute. Id.
266 Id. at 53.
267 Id. at 54. Presumably, this only applies where the public rights
determination is based on the existence of a pre-existing common law right.
Where based on a right at admiralty or equity, the applicability falters.
268 This is subject to the limitation of the Federal Government operating in its
sovereign capacity. Consider the application of this rule to patents, and where
jury trial rights have been ascribed in that arena.
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analysis cannot be so simple.2 69 Instead, in cases between private
litigants, the critical question regarding the applicability of the
public rights exception is whether Congress "[has] create[d] a
seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."270
More specifically, "[i]f a statutory right is not closely intertwined
with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact,
and if that right neither belongs to nor exists against the Federal
Government, then it must adjudicated by an Article III court."271
Thus, where private parties are involved, and where the statutory
right in question does not have common law antecedent, Congress
may assign the right's adjudication to a non-Article III tribunal if
that right is so intertwined with a federal regulatory program "that
it virtually occupies the field."272 Cleary, the right is limited in
scope, at least with respect to the participation of private parties.273
Summarizing the Court's analysis, the public rights calculus is
simple when the Federal Government is involved in its sovereign
capacity as a party.274 However, where private parties are involved,
the complexity heightens significantly.27 5 Where a federal statute
is applied, that statute may or may not implicate public rights
depending upon whether the statute is analogous to a right that
269 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985)).
270 Id. (quoting Thomas, 472 U.S. at 593-94 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment)).
271 Id. at 54-55 (emphasis added).
272 Id. at 54 (quoting Thomas, 472 U.S. at 593-94 (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment)).
273 In the context of a jury trial analysis, the Court is careful to address the role
of the adjunct where private parties are involved. In the Court's estimation,
confusion bounded after Atlas regarding when an Article I adjunct may be used
to assist an Article II court with fact-finding. Id. at 55 n.10 (citing Atlas
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 n.7 (1977)). In Granfinanciera, an adjunct in a dispute between private
parties may not be used in all instances-such a result "[would] render the
Seventh Amendment a nullity." Id.
274 Id. at 51.
2751 d. at 54-55.
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traditionally existed at common law.276 To the extent that the right
does not exist at common law, public rights apply where the right
itself is closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program.2 7
Of course, the Court is clear to highlight the synonymous nature of
the jury trial right and the public rights exception.278 Where a
determination has already been made that there is a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, then this is conclusive.279 A jury
trial right, traditionally existing at common law, cannot be usurped
as a public right given that the public right itself must not be
analogous to a common law right.280
Applying the analysis above to the fraudulent conveyance
action, the Court concludes that the right at issue takes on the
character of a private right. After all, and in further affirmation
plurality's opinion in Northern Pipeline, the Court declared that
"matters from their nature subject to a suit at common law or in
equity or admiralty lie at the protected core of Article III judicial
power." 281' There is little question, in the Court's opinion, that the
fraudulent conveyance claim closely resembles a common law
contract claim. As such, it is not a public right. Importantly, the
Court further concluded that because the fraudulent conveyance is
more aptly defined as a controversy arising out of the bankruptcy
proceeding instead of constituting a direct part of the proceeding,
it was inappropriately before that court.282 Put another way, the
claim at issue more nearly resembles common law contract claims
utilized to augment an estate "than they do creditors' hierarchically
ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res. "283 It is
276 Id.
277 Interestingly, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Granfinanciera,
declines to provide examples of where a statutory right might be sufficiently
intertwined with a regulatory program so as to be a public right. Id. at 52-55.
This leaves the reader with only vague indications as to what this truly means.
278 Id. at 51-52.
279 See id.
280 This assumes the absence of the Federal Government as a party.
281 Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.25 (1982)).282 Id. (citing Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1932)).
283 Id. It is important to note that in so remarking, the Court was clear to
establish that it was not its intention to carve out the restructuring of debtor-
[VOL. 13: 287338
Patents and Public Rights
true that the structuring of debtor-creditor relations is at the core of
Federal Bankruptcy power and thus such matters are properly
before the Article I Bankruptcy Court; however, such power does
not include the court's ability to adjudicate private, common law
rights.284
Within the context of the public rights analysis, the
congressional delegation of subject matter as either core or non-
core is meaningless. Instead, the key, decisive question is whether
Congress created a new cause of action existing separately from
and unknown to common law because "traditional rights and
remedies were inadequate to cope with a manifest public
problem."285 In this case, Congress merely reclassified a common
law cause of action in the statutory context and sought to subvert
otherwise overriding constitutional mandates by doing so. Though
the right at issue was statutory in nature, it was highly analogous to
preexisting rights subject to Seventh Amendment and Article III
concerns, and as such, Congress was restricted from either
creditors relations as pure public right. Id. at n.11. Instead, the analysis of, e.g.,
"hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share" was designed to help aid the
determination of whether the fraudulent conveyance action was one traditionally
found at common law. Id. at 56. Consider in the context, for example, of patent
validity before a bankruptcy court. Is this a dispute arising out of the
proceeding, or is it an integral part of it? Additionally, though statutory in
nature, is the right analogous to a common law right?
284 Id. at n.12 (citing N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71).
285 Id. at 60 (emphasis added) (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 461 (1977)). It is interesting
that Justice Brennan chose, during the latter stages of the opinion, to introduce
this concept of "manifest public problem" in the public rights analysis. Id. at 60.
Viewed in light of prior portions of the opinion, manifest public problem might
be reasonably interpreted to read on the public regulatory scheme concept. In
essence, the elements may be read together, i.e. where private parties are
involved, public rights exist where statutory claims without common law
ancestors are closely intertwined with public regulatory scheme airned at curing
a manifest public problem. Clearly, and to the extent that such an opinion of
Justice Brennan's opinion can be accepted, this is a narrow reading of public
rights as applied to private parties. It is thus no surprise that the decision cites
heavily to both Crowell and Atlas; Thomas and Schor appear, in many respects,
to be overruled (though not expressly).
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removing the litigant's right to a jury trial or assigning it to an
Article I tribunal in the first place.286
K. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck
Joy Technolgies, Inc. v. Manbeck8 7 is an interesting case, and
here the Federal Circuit was again charged with applying the
public rights exception to patents in an administrative context.28 8
Unlike the Circuit's decision in Patlex, however, in Joy, the
Federal Circuit was asked to evaluate the constitutionality of the
reexamination-as opposed to reissue-statute.2 89 With respect to
the constitutional issue before the court, the facts are relatively
simple. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences sustained
the rejection of various claims in a reexamination proceeding and
the aggrieved patentee appealed alleging impermissible deprivation
of the jury trial right as well as an impermissible assignment of a
judicial issue to an Article I tribunal.29 0
The patentee argued, inter alia, that Granfinanciera raised
serious questions regarding the vitality of Patlex.291 The Federal
Circuit, however, in an exceptionally short opinion disagreed, and
instead held that Granfinanciera affirmed the basic underpinning
of Patlex.29 2 Specifically, because Granfinanciera confirmed that
where public rights are found to apply, there cannot be a
constituent Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial given the
commonalities underlying the respective forms of analysis
applicable to each.293 Given that Patlex held that the legitimacy "of
a valid patent is primarily a public concern and involves a 'right
that can only be conferred by the government,' " nothing in
Granfinanciera gave the Circuit reason to doubt that the matter of
patent validity as applied in an administrative setting fell within the
286 Id. at 61.
287 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
288 Id. at 228. Recall the Federal Circuit's analysis in Patlex as it is relied
upon heavily by the Circuit in Joy.
289 Id. at 228.
290 Id. at 227.
291 Id. at 228.
292 Id.
293 id
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public rights exception.294 Because Granfinanciera re-established
Crowell as the controlling standard with respect to the application
of the public rights exception, the issue of patent validity really
was not a matter of private right at all." Thus, this aspect of the
analysis fell out altogether; instead, the question, as posed in
Crowell, was whether the patent right was one that arose "between
the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments."296 Given that Patlex had
already established that a patent was primarily a public concern,
the Circuit reasoned that this prong of Crowell was satisfied.297
Of the various Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions
discussed in this Article, Joy is clearly the weakest.298 The decision
relies heavily upon Patlex and Crowell, and yet only gives
remedial lip service to each. At the core of the holding of Patlex
was the concept of governmental mistake.2 99 At least in that
decision, the Circuit attempted to reconcile its opinion with
McCormick." The decision arguably withstood scrutiny under
McCormick to the extent that it limited its holding with its narrow
carve-out. Specifically, reissue was not unconstitutional because it
permitted a remedial measure to eliminate government mistakes.30 '
However in Joy, the Circuit declined altogether to mention this
important limitation. Instead, the CAFC portrayed Patlex as
294 Id. (quoting Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir.
1985)).
295 id
296 Id. at 228-29 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
297 The Federal Circuit goes as far as to declare that, in a field of law
dominated by Supreme Court precedent, "Patlex is controlling authority." Id. at
229.
298 There are differing notions of consent as applied to reissue versus
reexamination. Given that waiver is not appropriately applied to the Article III
analysis, it is not addressed here. Additionally, the Federal Circuit declines to
raise the issue as well. This may not be surprising given that the public rights
issue before it arose from reexamination.
299 See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604.
300 McCormick, though a dated decision, is still controlling Supreme Court
precedent today. In Joy, the court declined to mention this case altogether. See
generally Joy, 959 F.2d 226.
301 See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604.
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standing for the broad proposition that the validity of a patent is
fundamentally a right that exists between the government and an
individual, even though it is generally litigated amongst private
parties."' Given that the government is not participating as a party
in its sovereign capacity, however, it is unclear how this mode of
analysis directly applies.
Instead, the analysis should have taken the form of what was
espoused in Granfinanciera, which the court (somewhat
paradoxically) cited extensively.3 03 Where private parties are
involved, a court should look, in part, at the statutory right in
question and determine whether it is analogous to any common law
forebears."* In the instance of a property right granted by the
Federal Government, there is no shortage of cases grounded firmly
in common law that deal with this precise issue, but the Circuit
declined to address them.305 Thus, not only did the Federal Circuit
take Patlex and meld its narrow, mistake-based analysis into
something far broader, it did so while both citing to and yet
ignoring the recent proclamations of the Granfinaciera Court.
Lastly, Joy must be read in light of McCormick and Patlex. In
McCormick, the Court unequivocally established that the issue of
patent validity fell within to the sole discretion of Article III courts.
Patlex held that while McCormick was still law, reissue remained
constitutional in that it provided the government the opportunity to
remedy its mistakes committed during the patent prosecution
process. Joy, applying Patlex, held that the issue of patent validity
is, in all respects, a public right and thus amenable to adjudication
by Article I agencies. Read together, the Federal Circuit is
302 The Seventh Circuit, by comparison, stated that "[t]he question of the
validity of any particular patent is a private issue between the patentee and
alleged infringers, and not a public issue of industry-wide or regulatory
concern." Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57,
62 (7th Cir. 1980).
303 joy, 959 F.2d 226.
304 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). This is in addition to
determining whether the right is integral to and intertwined with some federal
regulatory scheme. Id.
305 Recall that in Patlex the Federal Circuit admitted repeatedly to the property
characteristics of the patent for intellectual property and the common law rights
that invariably attached. See Patlex, 758 F.2d at 599.
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unmistakably admitting that any invalid patent is the end result of a
government mistake. Mistake is not limited by the facts of Patlex,
but instead applies in all instances where a patent is found to be
invalid, irrespective of the circumstances"o' that led to a conclusion
of invalidity. Because the government grants the right, and
because invalidity necessarily implies governmental mistake,
invalidity comes in under public rights. But this holding simply
cannot be reconciled with McCormick. McCormick reserved
validity to Article III; Joy granted it in all instances access to
Article I. In many respects, Joy seeks to overrule McCormick but
without expressly doing so. By virtue of being Supreme Court
law, however, McCormick is still the controlling brand of
precedent. That the Federal Circuit, in its curious finding, declined
to address this important case altogether should be telling."'
L. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation
Though United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation30 s does not
include a highly detailed analysis of public rights precedent, the
case is important in that it demonstrates the Court's adherence to
the more restrictive line of cases regarding the doctrine. In this
case, the Court was presented with the question of whether the
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applied to the
general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian
tribes.309 In making this determination, the Court considered, inter
alia, whether the trust in question took on the characteristics of a
private common-law trust, and was thus susceptible to the
exception to waiver.
In determining that the general trust relationship existing
between the government and the Indian tribes did not mimic a
private common-law trust, the Court undertook an analysis of the
306 A basis for invalidity may include inequitable conduct.
307 It is undeniable that there were strong policy considerations driving the
Federal Circuit's finding in this case. However, its analysis, in light of Crowell,
Atlas, Patlex, Granfinanciera, and others, does not comport with the controlling
standards dictating the public rights analysis. As such, there are serious
questions regarding the issue of patent validity as a public right.
308 131 S.Ct. 2313 (2011).
309 Id. at 2318.
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applicability of the public rights exception. The government was
free to craft the bounds of the rules per its discretion to the extent
the trust relationship between the government fell within the
purview of the exception.310 The Court's public rights analysis in
Jicarilla is not extensive. However, given the contemporary
nature of the decision, its holding with respect to public rights is
interesting. Namely, in light of Granfinanciera and compared
against Thomas, the Court once again appears to adopt a restrictive
interpretation of public rights."
Given that the government may or may not consent to be liable
to private parties, the Court remarked, if the government does
provide consent, it may do so by its own controlling terms.312
Thus, according to the Court, the distinction between private rights
and public rights lies with the identity of the parties."'
Specifically, cases of private rights exist amongst private parties,
and cases of public rights "arise between the government and
persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance
of the constitutional functions."314 In the case at bar, the
management of the Indian trust "is a sovereign function subject to
the plenary authority of Congress.""' Given that Congress retains
plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters, the
power is one that exists solely with the legislative branch. As
such, the public rights exception applies and Congress is free to
determine how, and to what extent, any waiver of privilege might
apply.
In light of the limited nature of the Court's public rights
discussion in Jicarilla, it is unclear what precedential value might
be ascribed to it in terms of defining the exception." 6 However,
several important points are established in the case. It is clear in
3 o See id. at 2323.
311 See id.
312 Id. (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
272, 283 (1855)).
313 Id.
314 Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)).
315 Id.
316 See e.g., Stem v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2598 (2011) (discussing
Jicarilla only briefly).
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reading Jicarilla that the Court has adopted a restrictive view of
the exception. Unlike prior decisions, the Court defined the public
rights versus private rights dichotomy in simple, familiar terms."'
For example, the Court quoted from both Murray's Lessee and
Crowell to establish that the chief distinction among private and
public rights is the identity of the relevant parties."'1 Where the
government is a party and a dispute arises relative to the
government's performance of constitutionally-mandated functions,
public rights apply. Conversely, where the parties are private in
nature, the dispute is one of private rights.3 19
Though the case is one where the government is in fact a party,
and does not seek to define when public rights might be found
where private parties are exclusively present, it does mark a return
to a party-based analysis that had received criticism in prior
decisions.32 0 Thus, though the case itself may not mark a
watershed moment in terms of public rights analysis, its restrictive
application of public rights, relying solely upon Murray 's Lessee
and Crowell, is indicative of the Court's general tenor post-
Granfinaciera.
III. STERN V. MARSHALL
Stern marks the Court's most recent, and since Granfinaciera,
most detailed pronouncement regarding the state of public rights
jurisprudence.32 ' Though the decision touches upon only the
constitutionality of a counterclaim catch-all provision similar in at
least some respects to the one discussed in Schor, the decision
invariably contributes to the broader principles governing public
rights.3 22 In addition to the Court's discussion of public rights in
bankruptcy, the Court touched upon important concepts of consent,
and whether it was sufficient to cure shortcomings under the
317 See Jicarilla, 131 S.Ct. at 2323.318 d
319 These rights are subject to the distinctions discussed in Crowell.
320 See e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585
(1985).
321 See Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2594.
322 id
SPRING 2012] 345
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
requirements of Article 111.323 Thus, though the Court in Stern
only directly analyzes the constitutionality of a counterclaim
provision in Bankruptcy Court, the ramifications of the Court's
finding, as well as constituent commentary, are potentially far-
ranging in the administrative context.
A. The Court's Commentary on the Public Rights Exception
The procedural history underlying Stern is complicated and
only the relevant elements, as they relate to the constitutional
issues discussed herein, will be reproduced here. Specifically, a
party filed a petition for bankruptcy in the Central District of
California.3 24  A second party filed a proof of claim for a
defamation action, marking its intentions to recover damages from
the primary party's estate.3 25 The primary party, in response to the
proof of claim for defamation and utilizing the Bankruptcy Court's
counterclaim provision, filed a counterclaim for tortious
interference.32 6 The Bankruptcy Court then issued a substantial
judgment in the primary party's favor.327 On appeal, the aggrieved
party alleged that the statutory grant of judicial power, i.e. the
Bankruptcy Court's ability to hear common law tortious
interference claims, was unconstitutional under Article III.328
The statutory grant at issue was 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C),
which, in part, designated as "core" all counterclaims by the debtor
323 See id. at 2628.
324 See id. at 2594.
325 See id at 2601. As mentioned previously, this Article does not seek to
examine the constitutionality of the common law defamation claim before the
Article I Bankruptcy Court. Instead, it is designed analyze the constitutionality
of a proof of claim directed towards a patent matter under the counterclaim
provision post-Stern. Given that consent appears to be the primary force
underlying the constitutionality of the defamation claim, it is acknowledged that
the perceived modes of analysis of constitutionality reserved for the primary
proof of claim versus the counterclaim may not be readily severable. Consent as
a means for curing Article III defects is discussed infra Part VI.
326 See id. at 2601-02.
327 See id.
328 See id.
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against any entity filing a proof of claim against the estate.3 29 The
Court first sought to determine whether the counterclaim was
properly before the Bankruptcy Court per the text of the statute.3
Applying, e.g., traditional canons of statutory interpretation, the
Court agreed that the tortious interference claim was properly
before Bankruptcy Court as a core proceeding under Title 11 .311
Interestingly, during a related discussion of bankruptcy jurisdiction
over personal injury torts, the Court remarked that a party may
waive an objection to the bankruptcy court issuing final judgment
on a non-core claim.332 It is unclear what relation, if any, this
statement was intended to hold for the bounds of Article III. After
all, the Court had declared in prior decisions that the requirements
of Article III were beyond the discretion of private litigants.33 3 The
severability of the issues, i.e. Article III versus statutory grants,
however, is unclear. On this point, the Court merely concludes
that the party filing the proof of claim for defamation consented to
the Bankruptcy Court's resolution of the claim.334 At this stage of
329 To the extent that issue before the Bankruptcy Court was not core with
respect to Title 11, the court could only issue proposed findings of fact and law.
Where the issue was core, the administrative court had power to enter final
judgment. See id. at 2596.
330 See id. at 2601-02.
331 See id. The Court's analysis with respect to the statutory interpretation is
only tangentially related to the constitutional concerns and is not repeated here.
See id. at 2596.
332 See id. at 2605-06. In the context of the Court's statutory analysis, this
comment is confusing. The Court, in so commenting, is addressing waiver with
respect to perceived venue provisions of the bankruptcy grant. Id. (discussing
further 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) and its authorization of district courts with the
consent of all parties to refer a "related to" matter to the bankruptcy court for
final adjudication). Though this commentary enters the Court's opinion at the
statutory phase, it is not readily severable from the Article III underpinnings.
333 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-54
(1986). Still, as suggested in the prior footnote, the Court appears to be
indicating that waiver is a cure-all with respect to bankruptcy jurisdiction. It is
unclear how this could be interpreted to mean that statutory limitations may be
waived, but Article III concerns may not. The issues appear to be intrinsically
linked per the Court's commentary. Id.
334 See Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2606. The Court cites to Yakus v. United States for
the proposition that any right, including constitutional rights, may be forfeited.
SPRING 2012] 347
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
the opinion, the Court concluded its analysis of the appropriateness
of the defamation claim before the Bankruptcy Court."' Though
Article III is not expressly mentioned, it appears to be subsumed
by the Court's discussion of waiver and its general applicability to
"constitutional right[s]." The Court then transitioned its analysis to
a discussion of the constitutionality of catch-all counterclaim
provision under Article 111.336 In ultimately deciding that Article III
was violated, and that the only issues thus properly before the
Bankruptcy Court per the statute were those that implicated public
rights, the Court tacitly posits an important question that should be
kept in mind as Article III is evaluated: why did waiver cure
perceived constitutional defects in the common law defamation
proof of claim before the Article I tribunal, whereas the same
concept of waiver could not save a common law tortious
interference counterclaim under Article III?137
Addressing the constitutionality of the counterclaim provision,
the Court initially discussed important precedents that have shaped
Article III jurisprudence.338 Where the suit is one at common law,
Id. at 2608. The applicability of this case to Article III is discussed infra note
434.
3 Id. at 2608.
6 1d. at 2608-10.
337 Put another way, the Court appears to be choosing to selectively apply
constitutional standards based on the stage of proceedings. If Article III is
immune from waiver, and if the Bankruptcy Court is in fact an Article I tribunal,
then on what grounds is a common law defamation claim between private
litigants properly before the administrator? In Stern, the analysis with respect to
defamation appears to be strictly jurisdictional and thus, in the Court's
estimation, subject to waiver. Id. at 2606. But the issue goes beyond
jurisdictional requirements and very clearly implicates separation of powers.
Thus, if tortious interference falls out of the judicial equation at the Article I
level because public rights are at issue, the on what ground does the Article I
bankruptcy judge decide, with finality, the initial common law defamation
claim? Curiously, the analysis seen in cases such as Granfinanciera is only
applied to the counterclaim. See generally Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33 (1989).
3 See Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2609. The Court cites to Murray's Lessee and
Northern Pipeline. Id. At this stage, the concepts are well-worn: "The
Constitution assigns that job-resolution of 'the mundane as well as the
glamorous, matters of common law and statute as well as constitutional law,
issues of fact as well as issues of law'-to the Judiciary." Id. (quoting N.
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equity, or admiralty, then the responsibility of deciding that suit
rests solely with the Article III courts; Congress may not withdraw
such matters from the cognizance of the judiciary. The Court
recognized, however, that there is a class of public rights that may
in fact be assigned to the legislative branch for adjudication
without violating the tenants of Article III. In addressing public
rights as applied to bankruptcy courts, the Court acknowledged
that the Northern Pipeline decision failed to define the express
bounds of the exception."' However, Northern Pipeline did
establish that the state common law claim at issue did not qualify,
and further established that in light of the various powers granted
to the bankruptcy judges,34 0 they were not acting as mere
adjuncts.341 Given that the tortious interference claim, much like
the common law claim found to be unconstitutional in Northern, is
grounded in state common law,342 the Court concluded that, absent
an exception, it was an unconstitutional grant of Article III power.
The Court then sought to determine whether the public rights
exception saved the common law tortious interference claim before
the Article I tribunal. Interestingly, the Court drew an initial,
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86-87 n.39 (1982)
(plurality opinion)).
3 See Stern,13 1 S.Ct. at 2611.
340 See id. at 2610 (citing N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69-72). Recall that the
analysis in Northern Pipeline was not centered on a question of federalism;
instead, the Court couched its language, as generally seen in public rights cases,
in terms of separation of powers. Thus, the finding of unconstitutionality was
driven primarily by a common law character of the claim, as opposed to its
origins in state law.
341 See id. at 2611. The Court confirms in Stern that, like Northern Pipeline,
the bankruptcy judges under the revised act are hardly operating as mere
adjuncts. See id. The details of this analysis will not be reproduced here.
Instead, it suffices to mention that the usual hallmarks abound: ability to
determine matters of fact and law, ability to issue final judgments, standard of
review is the usual, limited appellate standard, etc.
342 See id. at 2611. The opinion includes repeated reference to the fact that the
matter is grounded in state common law. Id. Despite these references, it is
unclear what import, if any, the state-based nature of the claim carries in the
public rights analysis. Instead, the public rights analysis carries in the same
fashion as seen in prior cases-it is the common law nature of the claim that
determines constitutional muster.
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important distinction on this point: Where the proof of claim at
issue is a "federal claim[] under bankruptcy law, which would be
completely resolved in the bankruptcy process of allowing or
disallowing claims," then that claim is properly before the Article I
court.343 However, where the claim exists "independent[ly] of the
federal bankruptcy law and [is] not necessarily resolvable by a
ruling on the creditor's proof of claim," then public rights may not
apply.'" Given that the claim at issue is one of common law, and
thus exists independently of the federal bankruptcy law, this
element of the public rights analysis immediately falters.345
Exploring the public rights exception in its broader context, the
Court in Stern provided an analysis of the various important cases
that had influenced public rights jurisprudence. Starting with
Murray 's Lessee, the Court recounted, in relevant part, that the
case established that where the right in question depends wholly
upon the will of Congress, then Congress could limit, by design,
the availability of any judicial forum.346 More directly, the Court
declared that "[t]he point of Murray's Lessee was simply that
Congress may set the terms of adjudicating a suit when the suit
could not otherwise proceed at all."347 The Court further addressed
the importance of the identities of the parties.34 8 As has been
recounted, prior public rights decisions established that where a
suit arises between the government and a private party pursuant to
the government's performance of its constitutional functions, then
the matter is one of public right. This is contrasted against matters
of private right, which the Court then defined as the liability of one
private entity to another under the relevant law. Importantly, the
Court cited to Crowell for this proposition. This is an interesting
development and, like Jicarilla, further supports the notion that the
343 Id.
344 Id. (emphasis added). Recall, however, that the original proof of claim was
a claim of common law defamation. Clearly, such a claim does not exist solely
in federal bankruptcy law. Read in the context of its analysis, the implicit point
is that waiver cured this defect.
345 Further consider in the context of patents which, like tortious interference,
do not find their base in federal bankruptcy law.
34 6 See id at 2611.
347 Id. at 2612.
348 Id.
[VOL. 13: 287350
Patents and Public Rights
Court applied the public rights exception per narrow guidelines.
Additionally, and in stark contrast to the public rights cases from
the Justice O'Connor-era, the Court in Stern expressly declared
that Crowell stood for the proposition that where private parties are
involved, the determination of facts may properly be determined
by an adjunct.349 In furtherance of this point, the Court additionally
cited to Atlas Roofing and Bakelite, and reaffirmed that where
wholly private tort, contract, or property cases are at issue, public
rights are not implicated."o
Though government as a party may be determinative, the Court
noted that later decisions disclaimed this as a requirement in order
for public rights to apply. Where the government is not a party,
the right at issue must depend upon some form of federal
regulatory scheme. Additionally, the "resolution of the claim by
an expert government agency [must be] deemed essential to a
limited regulatory objective within the agency's authority." 5 '
Thus, in order for there to be public rights amongst private parties,
the right in question must be "integrally related to particular
federal government action."352 In giving what appears to be
relatively short thrift to Thomas, the Court merely cites to it as
exemplary of this concept. Specifically, because the arbitration
right in question did not depend upon or replace a right already
349 See id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932)). Compare
against later decisions, which blurred the lines in terms of when determinations
of law may properly be before an Article I tribunal. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric., Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). With these statements, the
Court appears to be, at least in part, re-establishing Crowell as the controlling
standard.
350 Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2612-13 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 458 (1972) and Ex parte Bakelite
Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451-52 (1929)). The Court further reinforced the Atlas
holding; public rights apply where the government is involved in its sovereign
capacity under a federal statute. Id.
351 Id. at 2613. Interestingly, the Court in Stern does not cite to
Granfinanciera for this proposition, though there are certainly similarities in the
modes of analysis where private parties are implicated. Stern's requirement as
applied to the concept of a federal regulatory scheme, read in light of
Granfinaciera, appears to be more restrictive. Id On this basis, the Court may
have declined to cite to the prior decision here.
352 Id. at 2612.
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existing under state common law, it did not violate Article III.5 In
addressing Schor, the Court was equally tactful. Recall that in
Schor at issue was the constitutionality of a limited counterclaim
provision that related to alleged broker violations.3 54 Though the
counterclaim was at common law, the Court in Stern pointed out
that it was a competing claim to the same amount already at issue
before the Commission under the legislative act.355 Put another
way, given that the counterclaim was integrally related to the
primary claim at issue, there was no pragmatic method available
for severing them without destroying the otherwise permissible
administrative process altogether.356
The Court then finally transitioned to a discussion of
Granfinaciera. This case is particularly important given that it
represented the Court's latest pre-Stern proclamation on the state
of public rights in the bankruptcy context. According to the Court
in Stern, Granfinaciera stood for the proposition that where only
private parties are involved, public rights only apply where a
statutory right, belonging solely to the Federal Government, is
"closely intertwined with a federal regulatory program."357 To the
extent that these requirements are not met, then the dispute must be
adjudicated by an Article III court. Given that a fraudulent
conveyance action most nearly resembled a common law contract
claim as opposed to "hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata
353 Id. at 2613 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S at 584). Note that the more nebulous
notions of public rights espoused in Thomas, not surprisingly in light of cases
such as Granfinanciera, do not receive mention.
354 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854
(1986).
3 See id. at 2613-14 (citing Schor, 478 U.S. at 856). Additionally, the Court
pointed to other factors that were important in Schor: the singular nature of the
dispute, the extremely narrow class of potential common law counterclaims, the
highly particularized area of law, and the applicability of a specific federal
regulatory scheme. Id.
356 The holding of Schor, as demonstrated by the Court in Stern, is thus
exceedingly narrow. Id. Where common law claims are integral to the
resolution of administrative claims, they are properly before an Article I tribunal
provided that certain requirements are met. Id. The applicability of this concept
in the bankruptcy context is limited.
3 Id. at 2614 (citing Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54-55
(1989)).
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share of the bankruptcy res," it was unconstitutionally before the
Article I tribunal.58 Here, in the context of bankruptcy litigation,
the Court pinpointed an important mode of analysis. Where
separation of powers concerns are implicated by a particular right,
a court should look to see whether the right in question more
nearly resembles a claim to a share of the bankruptcy res or some
form of common law claim.
B. The Public Rights Exception Explored
Interestingly, in commenting upon the applicability of the
tortious interference counterclaim to public rights, the Court
declared that the claim "does not fall within any of the varied
formulations of the public rights exception in this Court's cases."35 9
A question is thus presented: after Stern, is the appropriate mode
of public rights analysis one where a court should look to see
whether a particular claim would qualify under the exception in
each and every single one of its various permutations? Clearly,
and stating the idea differently, a particular claim is more likely to
qualify under the broad, multi-factorial approach espoused in
Thomas than in Crowell, where the approach was undoubtedly
restrictive. A pre-formulation approach would ostensibly render
all cases, irrespective of temporal relation to one another,
superfluous but for the most broad; stated differently, if the
standard was to be governed by all, then the broadest would
necessarily control all determinations.36 0 Thus, the answer to the
primary question cannot be of the individualistic variety; the public
rights analysis is not built upon a patchwork of varied opinions
where the litigant's goal is to find the one piece that fits. Instead,
public rights must be viewed-like most other brands of
constitutional law-as evolutionary in character. To the extent that
358 Id. (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56). Importantly, the Court here is
highlighting the role of common law claims that are analogous to claims that
otherwise exist in federal statutes. Id. Where the statutory claim can be
analogized to a common law claim, it is unlikely a public right. Id.
359 See id. (emphasis added).
360 Arguably the "most broad" might be Thomas, though potentially
Schor-the notion is merely rhetorical, and an answer is not sought here.
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there are inconsistencies and contradictions, the latest in time
controls.
The mode of analysis actually utilized by the Court tends to
reflect an evolutionary, as opposed to piecemeal, mode. In
applying the facts before it to the public rights exception, the Court
initially established that the claim of tortious interference is not
one that can be pursued solely by the grace of executive or
legislative branches.36 1 Further, it is not one that historically could
have been determined exclusively by either of those branches.36 2
Instead, the claim exists at state common law,363 between two
private parties. Similarly, the common law claim did not flow
from a federal statutory scheme," nor was it completely dependent
upon, and necessarily resolved by, a claim properly before an
Article I tribunal under federal law.' These elements, when
viewed in their totality, are logical and controlled. Each element is
harmonized with the other; inconsistencies have been removed. As
such, when viewing the body of public rights law, it is important to
review all of the decisions, to the extent that it does not conflict
with the next in time, since each contributes to some degree.
Somewhat perplexingly, however, the Court, in the body of its
public rights analysis, again raises the concept of consent.366 Here,
361 See Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2614 (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856).).
362 See id. (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S.
50, 68 (1982)and Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)).
363 Again, it is important to emphasize that, against the backdrop of the
relevant public rights jurisprudence, it is not the state-based nature of the claim
that differentiates it from those that might be public rights. Instead, it is
common law character that controls. While it is true a claim existing solely to a
particular state cannot, by definition, be a right granted solely to the Federal
Government, this is only the initial stage of the analysis. As demonstrated, even
claims based wholly in federal statute may not be public rights where they are
analogous to rights that exist at common law.
364 Stern, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2598 (2011) (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584-85 (1985)).
365 Id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
856 (1986)).
366 Given that defamation is constitutional before the Article I judge, whereas
tortious interference is not, waiver had to invariably be discussed. Schor, 478
U.S. at 851. Additionally, compare waiver against the other attributes of public
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though the primary party apparently consented to the resolution of,
e.g., common law defamation claims before a non-Article III
tribunal by filing the initial petition for bankruptcy, the secondary
party did not truly consent to waiver of Article III limitations by
virtue of filing the proof of claim.367 Thus, waiver in the Court's
estimation is a one-way street.368 By filing for the protections
afforded by the federal bankruptcy laws, the filer forgoes any
institutional safeguards provided for by Article III. As such, the
entire discussion regarding public rights drops out entirely. A
creditor, conversely, is forced-as held in Stern-into the
Bankruptcy Court by the actions of the filer, and thus consent is
not achieved. 6 ' At the heart of this discussion is the underlying
idea that it is consent, or the waiver of the institutional parameters
of Article 1Il, that saves the constitutionality of the defamation
claim before the Article I court. However, this idea is predicated
upon the notion that important separation of powers safeguards
rights discussed in Stern and in other cases-the concept of waiver has hardly
received broad, uniform treatment. In some instances, it, as a cure for Article III
defects, has been foreclosed altogether. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.367 d
368 In some regards, it is paradoxical that the safe harbor of bankruptcy thus
includes certain penalties as well. A party seeking the protections afforded by
the bankruptcy laws intrinsically consents to the adjudication of Article Ill
claims by its creditors before the Article I tribunal. However, counterclaims to
the proof of claims are now, in most instances, precluded from resolution before
that same Article I judge. In essence, creditors may present a host of claims per
the waiver logic, but the petitioner for bankruptcy is defenseless in many
respects in terms of responding to them. Such defenses must come in,
presumably, at a later stage, and obviously before an Article III court. This
severing of claim and counterclaim builds large, inherent penalties for the
primary petitioner into the bankruptcy process.
369 At least with respect to counterclaims in bankruptcy court, it is now clear
that waiver cannot be achieved. Take, for example, the following scenario: the
primary party files a petition for bankruptcy, thus, per the Court's reasoning in
Stern, waiving any and all Article III limitations. A secondary party files a
proof of claim for patent infringement. The primary party then files a
counterclaim for patent invalidity. Without addressing whether invalidity is
necessarily determined, as described in Schor, by the infringement
determination, and assuming that patent validity is not a public right, then the
counterclaim of invalidity is improperly before the Article I court as waiver has
not been achieved.
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mandated by the Constitution are susceptible to waiver in the first
place.370
Returning to the more recognizable elements of the public
rights analysis, the Court further concluded that the authority
reserved to the Bankruptcy Court is hardly a particularized area of
law.37' Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court is not merely dealing
with issues of fact, but also matters of law. Given the broad nature
of the statutory grant of power, the Bankruptcy Court can hardly be
said to be an expert agency charged with determining narrow
issues-after all, at issue was the constitutionality of an Article I
tribunal charged with handling the federal bankruptcy laws
adjudicating state common law claims.372 Thus, according to the
majority in Stern, the only " 'experts' in the federal system at
resolving common law [claims] . . . are the Article III courts, and it
is with those courts that [the] claim must stay.""
Concluding, the Court offered what might be one of the more
concise statements regarding the controlling standard with respect
to this highly complex brand of constitutional jurisprudence.
According to the Stern Court, because the case involved "the entry
of a final, binding judgment by a court, with broad substantive
jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the action
neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regulatory
regime" it is an impermissible grant of judicial power.3 74 Further to
this holding, the Court enumerated on the numerous aspects
370 This notion is discussed infra Part VI.
"' Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
372 Without belaboring the point, it is clear that expertise with respect to
federal bankruptcy regulation has little, if anything, to do with common law
tortious interference (or defamation, for that matter).
37 Stem v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011) (emphasis added). In light
of statements of this variety, it is clear that but for the waiver analysis applied to
the defamation claim by the Court, defamation would, like tortious interference,
be unconstitutional before the Article I judge per the requirements of Article Ill.
Id.
374 Id. at 2616 (emphasis added). Further to this point, the Court remarked
that any interpretation of public rights that allows for the adjudication of such a
common law claim before an Article I tribunal transforms Article III "from the
guardian of individual liberty and separation of powers ... into mere wishful
thinking." Id.
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inherent in the bankruptcy judge's power that precluded the
application of the "adjunct" label."' These aspects are not
recounted here; instead, it suffices to say that the Court concluded
that the bankruptcy judge was clearly not an adjunct to the District
Court."'
C. Waiver
Notably, and perhaps most interestingly in Stern, Justice
Scalia, though while joining the majority,"' filed a separate
concurrence."' Justice Scalia expressed his view that the analysis
regarding the public rights doctrine had become needlessly
complex; the number of factors alone "should arouse suspicion that
something is seriously amiss with our jurisprudence in this area."7
More importantly, however, Justice Scalia appears to directly
address the issue of waiver raised by the majority. Specifically, in
his view, Article III judges should be "required in all federal
adjudications, unless there is a firmly established historical
practice to the contrary."3"o On the issue of the defamation claim,
Justice Scalia remarks that "[p]erhaps historical practice permits
non-Article III judges to process claims against the bankruptcy
estate . . . the subject has not been briefed, and I state no position
on the matter.""' In the context of the separation of powers
analysis, this is a critical development. Here, Justice Scalia is
disavowing the waiver analysis provided by otherwise would-be
majority. He is declaring that where public rights do not apply,
then only an entrenched historical practice can save the
constitutionality of a common law claim before the non-Article III
376 Id.
37 As a matter of note, the dissenting Justices were Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan,
and Sotomayor. Id. at 2602.
378 Id. at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia mentioned in part that
while he agreed with the majority's analysis of the public rights doctrine, the
doctrine itself had become needlessly complex. Id. In his estimation, the
applicability of the doctrine should be based on the identities of the parties
themselves; i.e. the government as a party method. Id.
379 Id.380 Id. (emphasis added).
381 Id. at 2621.
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judge.382 In the context of the counterclaim at issue, there is no
such historical practice and as such, the counterclaim is not saved.
When viewed against the backdrop of the majority's opinion,
Justice Scalia's concurrence really is not about the tortious
interference counterclaim at all. Instead, it is an express disavowal
of the waiver analysis used to save the constitutionality of the
defamation claim. As such, serious questions continue to abound
regarding the constitutionality of, e.g., common law claims in non-
Article III tribunals. If public rights do not apply, and if waiver
cannot cure the defect, on what grounds is the claim thus before
the Article I judge? Obviously, there are infirmities here, and the
separation of powers issue is ripe for additional challenges.
IV. PATENTS AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL
Though the analysis required for a determination of whether a
jury trial right applies under the Seventh Amendment is not an
exact match of the public rights calculus, there are, as discussed in
some of the aforementioned public rights cases, extensive
homologies. As such, a discussion of the Seventh Amendment
right, as applied to the matters of patent validity and patent
infringement, is meritorious to the extent that the analysis may also
be applied to the public rights determination. This is especially
true given the generally conclusory, unsupported nature of Patlex
and Joy.383 Where Patlex and Joy merely state a result, the Federal
Circuit's decision regarding the jury trial right embarks upon an in-
depth, albeit complex, analysis of patents in a common law-or-
equity context.384 As such, this analysis is "borrowed" for the
purposes of being directly applied under the public rights rubric.
Historically, the Supreme Court had determined that the matter
of patent validity was a legal issue and thus any determination
regarding the same by reason of unpatentability must proceed in a
382 id.
383 See generally Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Patlex v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
384 See Patlex, 758 F.2d 594, 604; Joy, 959 F.2d 226, 228-29.
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court of law.3 " Though acknowledging that the ancestral English
writ of scire facias allowed for the resolution of suits brought to
cancel a fraudulently obtained patent in courts of equity,386 these
writs had little relevance to whether claims of unpatentability
should be tried. Such claims belonged in the courts of law."' As
such, a constituent jury trial right attached.
After Tull v. United States,"' the analysis required to determine
whether a jury trial right attached to a particular cause of action
under the Seventh Amendment became more complicated.
Specifically, where presented with the question, a court must
determine if a particular action entails adjudication of legal rights,
or, conversely, the utilization of legal remedies.3 89 Where such
rights or remedies are found, a court must honor a litigant's
demand for a jury trial under the Amendment.39 0 In In re
Lockwood,391 the Federal Circuit applied this doctrine to a case
where invalidity was raised as a defense to an infringement
385 United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 365 (1888).
386 See id. at 360. In later decisions, the writ of scire facias has been
analogized to a claim of inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med.
Consultants v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
387 Am. Bell, 128 U.S. at 365. On this point, the Court declared "[p]atents are
sometimes issued unadvisedly or by mistake . . . [i]n such cases courts of law
will pronounce them void." Id. (emphasis added). Here, the Supreme Court
declares that the fact that governmental mistakes may lead to the issuance of
patents supports the finding that such issues regarding validity belong to the sole
purview of the courts of law. Id Compare against Patlex, where the Federal
Circuit uses the concept of governmental mistake to create a public rights carve
out. Patlex, 758 F.2d at 602.
388 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
389 Id. at 417.
390 Id. at 427.
3' 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995). Though the decision was vacated by the
Supreme Court, the analysis expressed therein regarding the jury trial right as
applied to patents was expressly adopted by the Federal Circuit in later
decisions: "The Supreme Court vacated Lockwood without explanation. Thus,
our analysis has been neither supplanted nor questioned. Although no longer
binding, we find its reasoning pertinent." Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am.,
Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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claim.392 Though the infringement claim was accompanied by a
request for damages, the infringement claim, as well as the
constituent damages request, was dismissed on summary
judgment, thus leaving only the invalidity defense claim.393 Thus,
the Federal Circuit sought to determine whether, under the Seventh
Amendment, a jury trial right applied where damages had been
removed from a lawsuit.3 94
It is not the act of filing for the declaratory judgment itself that
resolves the question; it is the nature of the implicated
controversies that is dispositive. Where there is a declaratory
judgment action, however, the court must look at the suit from its
"inverted" standpoint.3 95 More precisely, if- the identities of the
plaintiff and defendant are reversed, and if the plaintiff would have
been a defendant at common law, then there is a jury trial right
associated with the declaratory judgment.39 6 Thus, if according to
eighteenth century English practice, a defendant to an infringement
action alleging invalidity had a jury trial right, then that same
party, as plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, would enjoy the
same jury right. Perhaps more clearly, and according to eighteenth
century English rule, actions for patent infringement could
392 Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968. Interestingly, the Federal Circuit conceded in a
footnote that the Seventh Amendment does not entitle a party to a jury trial if
Congress has assigned the adjudication of a public right exclusively to an
administrative agency. On this point, the Federal Circuit declared:
[h]owever, as '[n]o one disputes that an action for [a declaration of
patent invalidity] may properly be brought in an Article III court,' this
limitation on Seventh Amendment protection 'does not affect our
analysis' . . . [thus] litigation concerning those patent rights in Article
III courts comes with the protections provided by the Seventh
Amendment.
Id. at 972 n.5 (citing Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4
(1990)). Compare this statement against the Circuit's holding in Joy. If public
rights, by definition, do not have a requirement regarding a jury trial obligation,
then how do patent matters with a jury trial right under the Seventh Amendment
comport with the Circuit's prior holdings regarding public rights?
393 Id. at 968.
394 Id.
395 Id. at 972.
396 id.
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traditionally be raised in both actions at law and at equity.397 The
patentee could sue for infringement at either law or equity
depending upon the relief requested. Where damages were at
issue, the relief was legal in nature and thus the issue was tried,
where desired, to the jury. Conversely, where the patentee merely
sought to enjoin future acts of infringement, the relief sought was
wholly equitable. As such, the patentee did not have a jury trial
right in this instance. In essence, then, the patentee had a choice as
to whether a jury would participate in the proceedings. Applying
the inversion method, and where damages are present in the action,
the filer of the declaratory judgment regarding invalidity thus
maintains the right to make this choice."'
Later decisions by the Federal Circuit further expounded upon
this holding.3 99 In Tegal, for example, a jury trial had been
requested by a party alleging patent infringement and further
seeking damages. The accused infringer did not file a
counterclaim, and instead only asserted affirmative defenses,
including invalidity. Six days before the onset of trial, the plaintiff
withdrew the request for damages. The Federal Circuit was thus
presented with the question as to whether the plaintiff, by
voluntarily withdrawing the damages claim, had rendered the issue
wholly equitable in nature.400 The test for the applicability of the
jury trial right, as seen in Lockwood, turns on whether the case is
more similar to cases tried in courts of law than to cases tried in
courts of equity. Thus, both the nature of the action involved and
the desired remedy must be evaluated. To the extent that the
397 Id. at 976. Consider the importance of this statement in the context of the
public rights analysis.
398 Id. It is worth noting that though damages were no longer in the suit, the
issue was disposed by virtue of a decision on the merits. Compare against a suit
where a litigant voluntarily withdraws a request for damages. Here, the jury
trial right does not attach.
399 To a certain extent, as discussed, these later decisions render it precedential
by adopting its analysis.
400 This determines whether the plaintiff s issue precluded any right to a jury
trial.
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criteria are in conflict, the nature of the remedy controls.4 0' With
respect to the nature of the patent infringement action, the Tegal
court again leaned on Lockwood. Specifically, in eighteenth-
century England, patent infringement could be determined at law
or equity. Thus, the infringement was, by its nature, capable of
dualistic application. The determining factor thus rested with the
nature of the remedy sought. As already discussed, where the
desired remedy is purely equitable in nature, then there cannot be a
right to a jury trial.
In light of these important cases, it should be apparent that the
claims of patent validity and patent infringement fall into one of
two molds, depending upon the remedy sought. Where damages
are implicated, the claims are traditionally under common law and
thus give rise to the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. Where the desired remedy is purely injunctive in
character, then the claims were historically resolved in courts of
equity. In either variant, the matters of patent validity and patent
infringement have an extensive history steeped in law or equity.
The Federal Circuit has conceded as much in its numerous cases
discussing the issue.402 Viewed in the framework of the public
rights jurisprudence, these findings are probative.
V. PATENTS FOR LAND, PATENTS FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS INHERENT TO
EACH
A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The
right rests on the same foundation and is surrounded and protected by
401 Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d at 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2001). Given that the nature of the remedy supersedes, where the remedy
unequivocally establishes a result, then the analysis is necessarily complete.
402 Though not addressed here, other Federal Circuit cases establish the same
result. See, e.g., In re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
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the same sanctions.403 [They share] in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.
404
Patents for land and patents for intellectual property one
critical trait-they are the highest evidence of title, conclusive
against the government, of a particular property right. Unlike
patents for intellectual property, however, where patents for land
are concerned, there is an extensive body of Supreme Court
jurisprudence discussing when, and under what circumstances, an
Article I tribunal may, per the requirements of the Constitution,
tamper with its perceived validity. Though many of these cases are
dated, they are still controlling law today. Given that patents for
intellectual property share in the same "bundle of rights" as patents
for land, land cases discussing separation of powers concerns
where land patents are implicated carry a special relevance. Where
there is a complete absence of meaningful jurisprudence discussing
separation of powers and patents for invention, there is an
overabundance where patents for land are at issue. In light of the
inseparable bond linking these two legal mechanisms,4 05 the
Supreme Court's cases discussing Article III and land patents are
highly relevant in the context of the public rights analysis.
A. Patents for Land
In the case of U.S. v. Stone, the Supreme Court confronted the
question of whether an Article I tribunal vested with the authority
to grant a patent for land retained the ability to later void and
revoke such grants where evidence of fraud, mistake, or absence of
403 Patlex v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting
Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877)) (acknowledging that
patents for land and patents for intellectual property share in the same
foundation and thus further share the same bundle of rights).
404 Id. at 599 (citing Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573,
1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
405 Compare the constitutional source of congressional authority for each
variety of patent: "Congress shall have power . .. to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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legal authority was presented.406 In resolving this question, the
Court unequivocally declared, in the first line of its opinion, that "a
patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive as against
the Government . . . until it is set aside or annulled by some
judicial tribunal."407 Further to this point, and of particular
importance in terms of undermining the mistake-based reasoning
presented by the Federal Circuit in its Patlex decision, the Court
clarified that where:
Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or by mistake . . . courts of
law will pronounce them void . . . [as] one officer of the land office is
not competent to cancel or annul the act of his predecessor. That is a
judicial act, and requires the judgment of a court.408
Thus, though while the act of issuing a patent is purely ministerial
in character and hence properly subject to Article I determination,
any additional act that seeks to either cancel or annul such a
patent-irrespective of the nature and identity of underlying
infirmity-is holistically judicial in character. As such, and
according to Supreme Court precedent, actions that seek
termination of a patent rest wholly within the authority of the
Article III judiciary. In the context of Stone, this meant that the
Secretary of the Interior overstepped the bounds of his
constitutional authority when he revoked the patent issued by his
predecessors.
The next case, Moore v. Robbins,40 9 follows in a similar mold,
and asks whether the Article I Secretary of the Interior was
constitutionally competent to rescind a patent for land where
multiple parties claimed ownership over the same land.4 10 Here,
the Court held that once:
the patent has been awarded ... and has been issued, delivered, and
accepted, all right to control the title or to decide on the right to the title
406 69 U.S. 525 (1865) (noting that the referred-to office is the Secretary of the
Interior and "his predecessors").
407 Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
408 Id. (comparing this against Patlex, 758 F.2d at 601, where the Federal
Circuit validated the Article I USPTO's ability to recapture administrative
jurisdiction over an issued patent "in order to remedy any defects in the
examination").
409 96 U.S. 530 (1878).
410 Id. at 534.
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has passed from the land office. Not only has it passed from the land-
office, but it has passed from the Executive Department of the
government. 411
As such, when a patent is issued, the title insulates the private party
from any and all authority or control on the behalf of the executive
branch. Evidence of fraud, mistake, error, or wrongdoing does not
change that fact-instead, the Judiciary retains exclusive ability to
present the appropriate remedy. As such, the Secretary of the
Interior "is absolutely without authority" to revoke an issued
patent.412 This is true even where the Article I "officers have, by a
mistake of law, given to one man the land which on the undisputed
facts belonged to another."413
B. Patents for Invention
In a case where the U.S. government had made use of a
patented invention without first obtaining a license or providing
just compensation, the Supreme Court unequivocally declared
"that an invention so secured is property in the holder of the patent,
and that as such the right of the holder is as much entitled to
protection as any other property."41 4  As provided for by the
Constitution, all forms of private property, including patents for
invention, cannot be taken for public use without just
compensation.4 15 Employment by the government is no defense
where an employee has converted the private intellectual property
of another with neither consent nor license for purposes related to
411 Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
412 Id. at 534. Further to the points above, the Court in Moore goes on to
declare that but for this rule, a patent, "instead of being the safe and assured
evidence of ownership which they are generally supposed to be, would always
be subject to the fluctuating, and in many cases unreliable, action of the [Article
I][ ] office. No man could buy the grantee with safety, because he could only
convey subject to the right of the officers of government to annul his title ...
[t]he existence of any such power in the [Article 1][ ] Department is utterly
inconsistent with the universal principle on which the right of private property is
founded." Id.
413 Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
414 Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 226 (1877) (emphasis added).
415 Exceptions include extreme necessity in time of war or immediate and
impending public danger. Id. at 234. Neither exception applied to the patent at
issue.
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public use. Where private property is concerned-existing as
either land or invention-agents of the government have no more
right to take the land than other, private individuals.4 16
Importantly, this case strongly evidences the notion that patents for
land and patents for intellectual properly are, in terms of the rights
at stake, essentially homologous.4 17
In the context of a discussion regarding patents for invention,
patents for land, and the underlying, shared rights necessarily
applicable to each, U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Co.418 is a
particularly important case. At issue in this case was, in part, a
question of whether the circuit courts had, the constitutional
authority to cancel and set aside patents that were otherwise issued
improperly. At the outset, the Court established-in a tenor that
should now sound familiar-that the "power, therefore, to issue a
patent for an invention, and the authority to issue such an
instrument for a grant of land, emanate from the same source ...
are of the same nature, character and validity, and imply in each
case the exercise of power of the government according to modes
regulated by acts of Congress."4 19 Additionally, and further
synonymous with patents for land, the process governing the
issuance of patents "is not the exercise of any prerogative power or
discretion by the President or by any other officer of the
government, but it is the result of a course of proceeding, quasi
judicial in its character, and is not subject to be repealed or
revoked by the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the
416 This point is reinforced in the Court's later cases; "[t]hat the government of
the United States when it grants letters-patents for a new invention or discovery
in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented
invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without
compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser, we have no
doubt." James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357 (1882).
417 Stated perhaps more clearly, the Cammeyer Court established that the
rights available to land patents are directly applicable to patents for invention.
Cammeyer, 94 U.S. at 226. That one pertains to physical property, whereas the
other covers invention, neither separates nor distinguishes the bundle of rights
applicable to both.
418 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
419 Id. at 358-59.
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Commissioner of Patents, once issued."4 20  Importantly, and
particularly relevant in the context of patents and public rights, the
Court then declared that "[t]he only authority competent to set a
patent aside, or annul it, or to correct it,for any reason whatever, is
vested in the judicial department of the government, and this can
only be effected by proper proceedings taken in the courts of the
United States."42 ' Thus, the circuit courts retained constitutional
authority over determinations affecting the validity of issued
patents for both land and invention.42 2
In Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell,4 23 a case devoted solely
to addressing the rights applicable to patents for land,424 the Court
again addressed a dispute where the government had twice issued,
to separate entities, a patent covering the same parcel of
property.425 Specifically at issue was the question of whether one
or both parties could be called to answer with respect to the
validity of the land patent before the officers of the Land
Department. In resolving this question, the Court held that U.S.
government lacked the constitutional ability, by the authority of its
own executive or legislative officers, to invalidate a patent by
issuing a second one devoted to same property. More generally,
the Court reiterated "we are of opinion that [patent validity] is
420 Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
421 Id. at 363 (emphasis added). This case, though dated, is Supreme Court
precedent and remains controlling authority today. In the context of the public
rights analysis, it's difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the statements of
Patlex and Joy with Supreme Court authority (such as American Bell) which
very clearly reserves the adjudication of patent validity to the Article III
judiciary. The concept of "governmental mistake" cannot be a carve out-it is
emphatically disclaimed by the Court.
422 Justice Bradley, writing for the Court in U.S. v. Palmer, related this
concept in memorable fashion: "[t]he government of the United States, as well
as the citizen, is subject to the Constitution; and when it grants a patent [for
invention] the grantee is entitled to it as a matter of right, and does not receive it,
as was originally supposed to be the case in England, as a matter of grace and
favor." 128 U.S. 262, 271 (1888).
423 135 U.S. 286 (1890).
424 The analysis extends, by proxy, to patents for invention as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 358-59 (1888).
425 Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell, 135 U.S. 286 (1890).
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"4126
always and ultimately a question of judicial cognizance. Thus
patent validity, irrespective of the mechanism employed, fell
beyond the constitutional purview reserved for the Article I Land
Department. Apparently believing that its point had not yet been
understood, the Court again reminded the Executive and
Legislative branches that "[w]e have more than once held that
when the government has issued and delivered its patents for lands
of the United States, the control of the department over the title to
such land has ceased . . . and we do not believe that, as a general
rule, the man who has obtained a patent from the government can
be called to answer in regard to that patent before the officers of
the land department of the government."4 27  In light of the
broadened post-issuance review power granted to the Article I
Patent Trial and Appeal Board by the America Invents Act, this
controlling statement holds particular relevance.
In yet another case dealing with Article I and issued patents for
land, the Court in Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co.4 28
held that the revocation of a granted land patent by an Article I
officer "deprive[d] the plaintiff of its property without due process
of law."42 9 Citing to Moore, the Noble Court established that
because the cancellation of patent was a judicial act that required
the judgment of a court, any annulment by an Article I officer
amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of due process.430
Once a patent has been executed and issued, "the land . . . has
426 Id. at 293. Further to this point, the Court explains that determinations
impacting validity invariably are of the variety "requiring judgment, discretion,
knowledge of the law and balancing of testimony, [and] are essential to the
exercise of the right to grant the property." Id. As such, and according to the
Court, patent validity determinations are incapable of Article I resolution. Id.
427 Id. at 301-02.
428 147 U.S. 165 (1893).
429 Id. at 176.
430 Additional cases further explore and address due process and its role in
determinations affecting patents for intellectual property. See, e.g., Leesona
Corp. v. U.S., 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (discussing eminent domain and
due process as applied to taking of patented intellectual property by the U.S.
Government); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d
57, 62 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that any order compelling a patentee to initiate a
reissue proceeding and thus surrender her property right amounts to an
unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law).
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passed from the government, and the power of these officers to
deal with it has also passed away."43 ' As such, any decision made
by the Article I officer affecting the validity of the issued patent
not only represented an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial
power, but also an impermissible deprivation of due process of
law.
As these cases and others demonstrate, it is well established
that patents for invention and patents for land mimic each other in
terms of the controlling rights inherent to each.432 Where patents
for land are concerned, once a patent issues it forever leaves the
constitutional grip of the Article I officer that promoted its
ratification. Given the near conjoined nature of the various
opinions, one can only surmise that at the end of the nineteenth
century the non-judicial branches of American government were
rapidly testing the waters in terms of attempting to identify the
proverbial loophole to the judiciary's tightening grip on patent
adjudication. Certainly the judiciary recognized this, and thus on
this point, and as the discussion above illustrates, the Court was
abundantly clear-where patents for both land and invention were
concerned, once the patents issued, any further involvement by an
Article I officer was constitutionally foreclosed. In the context of
public rights, where the nature of the right in question is invariably
linked to the determination of constitutionality, decisions of this
variety are undeniably critical.
VI. WAIVER AS A MECHANISM FOR CURING SEPARATION OF
POWERS DEFECTS
Where a patent is before a bankruptcy court under the
aforementioned counterclaim provision, the concept of waiver as
to any constitutional, Article III limitation cannot apply. However,
though waiver does not apply to the counterclaim in bankruptcy,
consent was the apparent anodyne that allowed the Article I
" Noble, 147 U.S. at 177; see also Michigan Land and Lumber Co. v. Rust,
168 U.S. 589, 593 (1897) (remarking that "[a]fter the issue of the patent the
[disputed patent validity] becomes subject to inquiry only in the courts and by
judicial proceeding").
4 32 id.
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bankruptcy court to issue a final decision on the common law
defamation claim. In light of this dichotomy, this discussion of
waiver and Article III does not directly implicate patents and the
counterclaim provision. Instead, it signifies broader ramifications
for all claims at common law before Article I tribunals. If the
consent analysis is cleaved from the Stern decision, the underlying
question becomes clearer: what saves defamation? Justices
Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito suggest consent; Justice
Scalia, though joining the aforementioned Justices in most
substantive aspects of the opinion, declines to ratify the- waiver
doctrine.4 33 He suggests that the answer may lie in an analysis of
historical practice. Neither suggested mode, however, finds
support nor foundation in judicial precedent. Thus, notions of
waiver and historical practice currently exist as nere, proposed
remedies; the accepted cure for what has now become a near
system-wide defect remains undefined.
In one of the more profound ironies existing in modem-day
American jurisprudence, the extensive body of case law addressing
the bounds of what qualifies under the public rights exception has
failed to ratify the exact mechanism that generally saves the
adjudication of judicial claims before modem-day Article I
tribunals. The Court has declined to confirm that the separation of
powers requirement mandated by Article III is a personal right
susceptible to waiver by an individual. Thus, though the public
rights exception has been addressed repeatedly-its application
complex and multi-faceted-the Court has never acknowledged
whether the most oft-utilized mechanism for remedying Article III
defects passes constitutional muster. Instead, the issue has only
been addressed by pluralities, concurrences, and dissents on both
sides of the proverbial coin. To this end, the Court, both past and
present, has cited to a litany of cases for the proposition that
Article III limitations either can or cannot be waived. These cases,
including those recently cited by Chief Justice Roberts in Stern, are
433 "Perhaps historical practice permits non-Article III judges to process
claims against the bankruptcy estate . .. the subject has not been briefed, and so
I state no position on the matter." Stem v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2621
(2011) (Scalia, J. concurring). Statements of this variety appear to indicate that
this issue is ripe for judicial challenge.
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only tangentially related to critically important concept of waiver
as applied to. Article III and thus bear little relevance to the
discussion.434
In Stern, four of the five Justices composing the majority
appeared to agree with the notion that consent is a viable
mechanism for curing Article III defects.43 5 The fifth Justice,
however, declined to join this portion of the otherwise-majority
opinion and suggested that defamation was properly before the
Article I court by virtue of a historical practice that legitimized the
jurisdiction.436 Given the lack of relevant precedent on the subject,
434 See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938) (holding
waiver inapplicable and inappropriate where private litigants sought to consent
to a hearing by a federal District Court lacking subject matter jurisdiction);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (establishing that the Constitution does not
include a complete, hermetic sealing off of the three branches of government);
Nixon v. Admin'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (holding that
separation of powers, as applied to Executive and Legislative branches, was not
absolute and only those Acts which threatened to disrupt the constitutionally-
mandated functions of the Executive Branch violated the principle); United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (holding the personal right to a
criminal trial is subject to waiver by a litigant); Bond v. United States, 131 S.Ct.
2355 (2011) (deciding that a private litigant has standing to challenge a law as
violative of federalism and separation-of-powers limitations. That an individual
has standing to challenge alleged violations of federalism has no bearing on
whether that same individual can waive, where a claim has previously been
found to be adverse to the requirements of the Constitution, the same federalism
concerns.). The Olano decision confirmed that the personal right to a jury trial
is amenable to waiver, in so holding the Court remarked that waiver may occur
"before a tribunal havingjurisdiction to determine [the issue]." Olano, 507 U.S.
at 731 (emphasis added) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444
(1944)). Further, the Court held that "[w]hether a particular right is waivable
. . . all depend[s] on the right at stake." Id. at 733. Interestingly, and despite
these statements, Chief Justice Roberts cited to Olano in Stern to support his
implied assertion that the requirements of Article III are subject to waiver.
Stem,131 S.Ct. at 2608. However, Olano merely established that the personal
right to a criminal trial is subject to forfeiture by consent. Olano, 507 U.S. at
742. That Olano was the chosen precedential cornerstone regarding waiver in
Stern is illustrative.
43s See Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2608.
436 See id. at 2620. Historical practice as a means of clearing Article III
deficiencies, beyond whatever analogy it might have to the public rights
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and further given that the Court declined to establish waiver theory
as law, all that remains clear after Stern is that the majority
approved the adjudication of the defamation claim by the
bankruptcy court. What remains unclear, however, is why the
defamation claim survives scrutiny-certainly, for many of the
same reasons that tortious. interference falls from the grasp of the
public rights exception, defamation does too. Thus this exception,
in all reasonable likelihood, does not apply. Further, and as
discussed, waiver cannot cure the defect as it is not an established
caveat to the public rights rule. Historical practice may provide a
foothold, but waiver as a means for dismissing Article III is
concurrence dicta and little more. In essence, the Court in Stern
declined to provide reason or doctrinal base legitimizing why it
cleared the defamation claim through the Article III filter. Thus,
though it is there, we do not know why.437  Given the vast
importance ascribed to the modem-day administrative scheme and
its role in assisting the judiciary, the failure to provide clear
reasoning with respect to this issue continues to be surprising.
The lack of clarity on this issue is problematic. In what has
become a truly startling development in this area of law, where
Article III challenges arise in arbitration proceedings, judges
almost uniformly cite to Schor for the idea that waiver cures all
perceived defect under Article III.438 But recall that Schor did not
establish this outright; instead, consent appeared as only one factor
to consider in Justice O'Connor's otherwise complicated and
multi-faceted analysis.4 39 Additionally, the Court in Schor
exception, has not received affirmation by the Court's precedents. Instead, it
suggests a standard that the Court might adopt in the future.
7 The Court in Stern cites extensively to the public rights exception and
expends considerable effort explaining what it is and how it applies. See id. at
2598. Despite these efforts, however, the Court in Stern somewhat
paradoxically decides to apply the standard in one context while ignoring it in
another.
438 Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189,
1200 (2008) (commenting that "many courts have rejected Article III challenges
to arbitration with a simple statement about waiver and a perfunctory cite to
Schor").
439 Many of these factors were not adopted in later decisions on the subject.
See, e.g., Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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unequivocally declared that "[w]hen these Article III limitations
are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive
because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties
cannot be expected to protect."'o Thus, in practical application,
Schor arguably stands diametrically opposed to what it is routinely
cited for with respect to alleviating perceived Article III infractions
in arbitration proceedings."' To the extent that this is not
demonstrative of a brand of systemic judicial confusion underlying
the constitutional allocation of responsibilities required by
separation of powers, then little exists that is.
In the absence of clear judicial guidance on this critical issue,
many scholars have opined on the matter. Some have argued that
because the Article III mandate is institutional as opposed to
personal, it is not susceptible to waiver."2 Personal rights only
impact the litigant who is choosing to dismiss them; institutional
rights, however, carry broader organizational implications even
though only an individual may choose to remove them.' Others
have argued that by the text of the Articles themselves and the
historical intent of the framers as demonstrated in The Federalist
No. 79 waiver inappropriately applies to Article III." These
arguments are complicated, and this Article does not seek to
reproduce them here. What is clear, however, is that the courts
have declined to provide controlling guidance on the subject.
Where the proof of claim for common law defamation survives and.
the counterclaim of tortious interference does not, the Court
appears to be acquiescing to predominant pragmatic concerns
related to the perceived future, continued functionality of the
Bankruptcy Court. Thus, the general usefulness of the Bankruptcy
Court was preserved and the Court's hesitancy to confirm waiver
doctrine remained intact. The end result is a defamation claim that
survives on presumed common-sense underpinnings but is
otherwise unsupported by the applicable constitutional law-the
440 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
441 These apply to Article 111, nonetheless.
442 See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 259 (1990).
3d
444 See Rutledge, supra note 438 at 1198-99.
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role of the public rights gatekeeper, the enforcer of the separation
of powers, is thus muddled.
In light of the foregoing discussion, waiver is not an
established means for curing separation of powers defects. It is
merely a proposed mechanism that has never received the
complete blessings of the Court and currently exists as a suggested
caveat to what is an exceedingly complex and conflicted doctrine.
A suggested caveat, however, is not rule-though lower courts
appear to apply waiver as a misguided rule under the rubric of
Schor, a litigant cannot point to consent in a constitutional context
and expect absolution. After Stern, what is known is that the Court
approved of the adjudication of a defamation proof of claim before
the Article I Bankruptcy Court without agreeing or explaining why
it was there. In this.capacity, the holding of Stern is extremely
narrow."' Where looking to determine whether a particular claim
falls within public rights, waiver is not a factor at all-or, to the
extent that it may be considered, it is merely one non-dispositive
factor of many.44 6 Thus, it appears that where a litigant is forced
into an Article I tribunal by virtue of a consent analysis, the
aggrieved party may have firm constitutional foundation for
challenging the holding.
VII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT RULES ON THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION'S ABILITY TO ISSUE FINAL, BINDING
JUDGMENTS
Interestingly, when the Federal Circuit visited the Article I
International Trade Commission's (ITC) ability to issue final,
binding judgments on claims of patent invalidity and infringement,
4s Narrow and paradoxical; Stern only establishes that defamation is not
precluded from Article I adjudication-but why? Are there attributes inherent
and idiosyncratic to the claim of defamation that renders it generally immune
from separation of powers constraints? Will a claim of defamation pass
constitutional muster as a counterclaim in bankruptcy court? If not a public
right, then what is it?
446 This notion has received only very limited support from the Court's varied
opinions on the subject.
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it did not embark upon a discussion of public rights.447 Instead, it
adopted a distinct, unique standard grounded in both statutory
construction and Congressional intent. In light of the somewhat
spontaneous adoption of these standards governing the scope of
permissible subject matter heard before Article I tribunals, the
forces delineating separation of powers potentially have become,
to a degree, further muddled. Still, and irrespective of the chosen
mode, the Federal Circuit declared that the Article I ITC does not
have authority to issue final judgments on the matters of patent
validity and infringement. In the context of an analysis of the
bankruptcy tribunal, this is a telling result.
The Federal Circuit first addressed the issue of the ITC's scope
of authority in Tandon Corp. v. International Trade Commission.448
On appeal, the court in Tandon was asked to overrule a final
determination by the ITC Commission that a particular patent was
not infringed.4 49 The court affirmed, on the basis that the
substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination of
noninfringement.450 In so finding, the Federal Circuit remarked
that though the substantial evidence standard of review applied to
ITC determinations carries less discretion and flexibility than the
clearly erroneous standard reserved for review of trial court
determinations, the ITC decisions themselves do not have a res
judicata effect and thus do not estop fresh consideration by other
tribunals.4 5' Given that the primary responsibility of the ITC is to
administer the trade laws-and not the patent laws-"[t]he
Commission's findings neither purport to be, nor can they be,
regarded as binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws . . . it
seems clear that any disposition of a Commission action by a
Federal Court should not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel
447 The Federal Circuit's cases on the subject neither mention nor discuss
public rights or separation of powers. As such, the reader is left to guess
whether the court's discussion is intended to replace the public rights analysis
or, conversely, that the public rights analysis has, in light of Patlex and Joy,
already been completed.
448 831 F.2d 1017, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
449id
450 d
451 Id.
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effect in cases before such courts."452 Thus, though ITC
determinations of the patent laws may be reviewed under a more
restrictive brand of standard of review, the decisions themselves
are not binding.
This issue was revisited by the Federal Circuit in Texas
Instruments v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.453 Here, the Federal
Circuit was asked on appeal to overturn a finding of
noninfringement by a district court.454 In a separate and parallel
action, and prior to the district court's ruling, the ITC found that
the patents in question were infringed.45 5 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Commission's finding under the substantial
evidence standard.45 6 Thus, the Federal Circuit was presented with
the question as to whether an ITC determination of a patent-related
matter that had been affirmed by the Federal Circuit carried
preclusive effect relative to the district court action.4 57  In
answering this question, the court remarked that in order for there
to be issue preclusion, there must be, inter alia, a valid and final
judgment.458  According to the Federal Circuit, though "[t]he
decision of an administrative agency may be given preclusive
effect in a federal court when, as here, the agency acted in a
judicial capacity ... an administrative agency decision ... cannot
have preclusive effect when Congress . .. indicated that it intended
otherwise."459 Given that the court had already established that
Congress did not intend to grant preclusive power to the ITC
determinations of patent-related subject matter, the decision of the
ITC, even when affirmed by the Federal Circuit, carried no
preclusive effect when applied to the parallel district court
proceedings.460 Thus, the ITC's determination was, in effect,
4 52 Id. at 1019 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1298, 9.3d Cong., 2d Sess. 196).
453 90 F.3d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
454 Id.
455 Id. at 1562.
456 Id at 1561.
457 Id. at 1568.
458 id.
459 Id. at 1568 (emphasis added).
460 id.
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neither valid nor final-at least as applied to the issue preclusion
calculus.
Strikingly, the Federal Circuit, in its decisions of Tandon and
Texas Instruments, appears to disavow the public rights dichotomy
altogether.461 Certainly, the Circuit was aware of the exception, as
evidenced by its decisions in Patlex (1985) and Joy (1992). But
Patlex and Joy dealt with public rights as applied to the Article I
USPTO's authority to deal with issues of validity where
reexamination and reissue procedures applied.462 In Patlex and
Joy, the Federal Circuit forged a narrow carve out under the public
rights doctrine so as to allow these important administrative
functions to continue.463 in Texas Instruments, the Federal Circuit
appears to simultaneously ignore both the limitations of its own
public rights decisions as well as the entire body of the Supreme
Court's public rights jurisprudence generally." Specifically, the
Circuit's declaration that any decision of an administrative agency
may be granted preclusive effect where it merely "acted in a
judicial capacity" both grossly misstates and directly contravenes
the Supreme Court's rulings governing separation of powers.4 65 If
the question were merely one of whether Congress "intended" to
grant judicial power to a particular administrative agency,
irrespective of identity or function of the right in question, then the
important separation of powers mandate guaranteed by the
Constitution dissolves entirely.
Also interestingly, and aside from the perceived role of
congressional intent in separation of powers determinations, the
Federal Circuit curiously declared in Texas Instruments that
"allowing prior ITC decisions on patent infringement questions to
have preclusive effect would potentially deprive the parties of their
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the issue of
461 See Tandon Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1017, 1021 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d.at 1568.
462 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604; Joy Techs., Inc. v.
Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
463 Patlex Corp., 758 F.2d at 605; Joy, 959 F.2d at 229.
464 See generally Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d. 1558.
465 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011).
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infringement."4 66 As has been discussed, the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial is a personal right-as opposed to an
institutional safeguard-and is thus subject to waiver.467 As such,
it is unclear on what basis, if any, the Circuit believes that the
application of this right precludes a determination by an
administrative agency over any one issue. Instead, the question as
to whether a jury trial right applies in the first instance is important
in that it bears on the question of whether a particular claim is or is
not a public right. This statement on the relevance of the Seventh
Amendment jury trial right by the court in Texas Instruments is
perplexing, and it is indicative of a lack of clarity in this important
and complex brand of law.
It must be admitted that the scope of authority46 8 granted to the
ITC is not directly related to the question of whether patent-related
claims fall within the definition of what are "public rights." Is it,
however, indicative. In Tandon and Texas Instruments, the Federal
Circuit appears to have conjured a separation of powers standard of
its own making, and declared that where Congress intended an
administrative agency to operate in a judicial capacity, the
decisions of that agency were afforded preclusive powers. It is
unclear where this standard finds its roots, and it very well may be
that, given the stark, obvious constitutional infirmities inherent to
both Joy and Patlex, the Federal Circuit sought to devise a new
standard that would serve the interests of the USPTO well. After
all, it would be all but impossible to argue that the Congress did
not intend the USPTO to hold adjudicatory power over of issues
of, e.g., invalidity and infringement. Applying this standard469
(maybe only provocatively, and setting speculative discussions of
its origins aside) it is unclear on what basis, if any, an Article I
tribunal assigned to the administration of the Federal Bankruptcy
laws would have authority to issue final, binding decisions on
questions related to patents. Under Tandon, substituting
466 Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d. at 1569 n.10.
467 Waiver is discussed supra Part 11.1.
468 This refers to the scope of the ITC's authority according to the Federal
Circuit.
469 This is not a controlling standard; instead, the Federal Circuit appears to be
merely proposing an alternative to the complicated public rights jurisprudence.
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bankruptcy for trade theoretically yields the same result: Given
that the primary responsibility of the Bankruptcy Court is to
administer the bankruptcy laws-and not the patent laws-"[t]he
[bankruptcy court's] findings neither purport to be, nor can they
be, regarded as binding interpretations of the U.S. patent laws."470
VIII. ANALYSIS: PATENTS, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND THE
REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE III
As discussed by the court in Stern, any notion that the Article I
bankruptcy judge operates as a mere "adjunct" of the district courts
can be dispensed with at the outset. Though it is not currently
certain, for many of the same reasons the bankruptcy judge is not
an adjunct, one may fairly surmise that the administrative law
judges assigned to the newly created Article I Patent Trial and
Appeal Board-given their power to issue binding decisions
related to any argument concerning the legal issue of patent
validity-do not qualify as adjuncts either. As such, where the
legislative branch envisions an Article I tribunal vested with the
power to issue final, binding judgments on the matters of patent
infringement and patent validity, the following question must be
answered: are patents public rights per the Supreme Court's
pronouncements regarding the exception in Stern?
Certainly the law governing the public rights exception is
complex, and the application of the standard is not a
straightforward process. Recall that the court in Stern appeared to
have applied a test utilizing various elements distilled from the
relevant prior Supreme Court decisions. Before applying the Stern
analysis, however, it is important to first confront McCormick,
American Bell Telephone Co., and Federal Circuit's Patlex
decision. McCormick established that Congress lacks the
constitutional authority to divest an owner of a patent for invention
of her title without first seeking impeachment by suit before an
Article III court. Reissue remained a valid mechanism, but only to
the extent that it allowed the patentee to rectify an error that may
have arisen due to inadvertence or mistake committed by the same
470 See Tandon Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 831 F.2d. 1017, 1019 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1298, 9.3d Cong., 2d Sess. 196).
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patentee. Any application of the reissue process that sought to
reopen the original question of patent validity before an Article I
officer was unconstitutional. American Bell held, in a similar vein
and relying upon the property for land cases of the era, that though
the process governing the issuance of a patent for invention is
quasi-judicial in character and subject to determinations made by
Article I officers, once issued, it "is not subject to be repealed or
revoked by ... the Commissioner of Patents."471  Any mistake
committed by the government-including the particularly
egregious example of the Article I department issuing multiple
certificates of title for the same parcel of land-was expressly
disclaimed by the Supreme Court as a means for reopening
questions of validity before the granting Article I officer.
The Federal Circuit in Patlex thus made a curious decision
when it decided that the curative nature of the reexamination
statute was the attribute that saved it from unconstitutionality.
According to the Federal Circuit, because a patent represents a
right that may only be conferred by the government, any legislative
mechanism that reopens questions of patent validity "to correct
errors made by the government, to remedy defective governmental
(not private) action" necessarily is a public concern and thus a
public right.472 This mode of analysis, however, had already been
expressly foreclosed by McCormick, American Bell, and many
other property cases addressing this precise issue. Further
curiously, the Circuit cited to Crowell for the proposition that
public rights encapsulate any right that is granted by the
government-recall, however, that Crowell was a highly restrictive
case in terms of its approach to public rights and its holding, in
large part, centered around the scenario where the government
itself was an active party to a litigation.47 3 The court in Patlex also
cited to the plurality's opinion in Northern Pipeline, but again, the
plurality in Northern Pipeline held that public rights merely relate
to rights that historically could have only been decided exclusively
471 United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363 (1888).
472 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
473 Id.
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by either the legislative or executive branches.47 4 Given that the
U.S. Government was not a party to the litigation in Patlex, and
further given that-as demonstrated by an overabundance of
controlling Supreme Court precedent-that once a patent for
invention issues, the validity of that patent cannot be revisited by
an Article I officer, the Federal Circuit's reliance on both Crowell
and Northern Pipeline to legitimize its governmental mistake-
based approach to public rights appears to lack merit.
Joy represented the next iteration of the Circuit's public rights
analysis and here, as has been discussed, the court dropped the
governmental mistake limitation in its entirety. Instead, the Circuit
concluded that because a valid patent is primarily a public concern
and further involves a right that may only be conferred by the
government, it is a public right.475 For this proposition, the court
cited to Granfinanciera. Granfinanciera established, however,
that where a right exists by the grace of government, the proper
analysis is whether that right has a common law antecedent.4 76 As
such, the Federal Circuit in Joy misconstrued the requirements of
the public rights exception. The analysis does not begin and end
with a discussion of whether a particular right exists at federal
statute; such a standard would broadly dilute the requirements of
Article III. The Federal Government could rather whimsically
create any right at statute as a mechanism for removing it from the
grasp of the judiciary. Further, whether or not a particular right is
a "public concern" has questionable, minimal relevance to the form
of analysis disclosed by the Granfinanciera Court. Instead, where
a right exists at statute, a court seeking to apply public rights must
discern whether, in part, that right found its roots in the common
law. At least in Joy, the Federal Circuit declined to resolve this
question.
In other cases, however, and in the context of the court's
analysis of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the Federal
Circuit has evaluated the matters of patent infringement and patent
474 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see
also supra Part II.F.
475 Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 229 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
476 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989).
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validity in a historical framework. As applied to patents and public
rights, disputes regarding patents for invention could have been
traditionally raised in both actions at law or at equity. The route,
according to the Federal Circuit, was ultimately determined by the
nature of the sought-after remedy. Where damages were
implicated, then the patent dispute was resolved at law.
Conversely, where a patentee merely initiated suit to enjoin future
acts of infringement, the case was properly tried in a court of
equity. Thus, depending upon the remedy sought by a patent
owner, a patent dispute could historically proceed in one of two
potential directions-either to a court of law or a court of equity.
Patents for invention are hardly a new mechanism, and the courts,
including the Federal Circuit, have been apt to refer to eighteenth
century English practice in the context of their discussions
addressing the matter. .Recall Murray 's Lessee, which held that
suits of common law, equity, or admiralty belong solely to Article
I.4 As Stern, Granfinanciera, and others have confirmed, this
core principle is still controlling law. Thus, whether a patent
dispute historically tracked into a court of law or equity, the result
is necessarily the same. Stated differently, a patent for invention
cannot be said to be a new and novel creation of the legislative
branch. The principles governing its creation are age-old, and they
find their roots deeply intertwined with the annals of common law
and equity. To answer the question of whether the rights
associated with patents include common law antecedents with a
conclusory affirmation that the right currently exists at Federal
Statute is to rather unceremoniously ignore the guiding
requirements of the public rights exception altogether. Applying
Granfinanciera, where a dispute takes place between private
parties, as is oft the case in patent litigation, and where a dispute
entails a right with common law antecedent, as is always in the
case in patent litigation, that right cannot be a public right.
In looking at Stern, the analysis does not change meaningfully.
Stern reaffirmed, after all, that where wholly private property cases
477 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284
(1856).
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are at issue, public rights cannot apply.4 78 Both this holding and
others regarding patents for land, invention, and Article III
generally cannot be reconciled with the Federal Circuit's attempt
to distinguish patents for invention, in the validity context, and
public rights. According to Stern, and much like the claim of
tortious interference before the Article I bankruptcy judge, the
claims of patent validity and patent infringement cannot be
pursued solely by the grace of the executive or legislative
branches.4 79 Additionally, they are not claims that could have
historically been determined exclusively by either of those
branches. Instead, these claims existed at either common law or
equity, between private parties nonetheless. Similarly, the
common law claims did not flow from a federal statutory scheme,
nor were they completely dependent upon, or necessarily resolved
by, a claim properly before an Article I tribunal under Federal law.
In virtually all aspects, patents as applied to the law of public
rights fail constitutional muster.
In its core application, the public rights doctrine looks at the
nature of the right in question. Take, for example, the facts of
Thomas. The court was asked to consider the constitutionality of
an arbitration provision relating to a pesticide scheme.48 0 It is easy
to discern how, under these circumstances, the right in question
might belong to the legislative branch of government. One may
have difficulty locating common law antecedent relating to data
sharing arrangements amongst pesticide manufacturers. With the
matter of patents and the constituent arguments, however, the issue
is equally clear, albeit on the opposite end of the spectrum. Patents
for invention have been around for centuries, and their history is
deeply rooted in law and equity.
Waiver, at least for the time being, is not a viable mechanism
for curing separation of powers infirmities. Schor, a case
frequently cited to for the proposition that the requirements of
Article III may be waived, unequivocally declared that "[w]hen
these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and
478 Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011).
479 Id. at 2598.
480 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 591 (1985).
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waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve
institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to
protect." 481' And though Stern came close to ratifying waiver as a
means for curing Article III limitations at least in the context of a
proof of claim in a Bankruptcy Court, Justice Scalia was careful
not to carve out any support in his concurrence for this proposition.
As such, waiver as mechanism for remedying Article III shortfalls
has yet to receive the blessing of the Supreme Court. To the extent
that patents do not comport with the requirements of public rights,
waiver cannot be the anodyne.
Lastly, and maybe merely provocatively, it is interesting that
the Federal Circuit held that the ITC's decisions regarding patent
validity and infringement do not carry preclusive effect due to the
fact that the ITC's primary responsibility is to administer the trade
laws, and not the patent laws.482 Thus, just as the preclusive power
of the ITC is relegated to the trade laws, then the preclusive power
of the Bankruptcy Court must be limited to the bankruptcy laws.
Of course, assuming that the jurisdictional requirements have been
met, this is not the standard-the public rights analysis controls-
but it is indicative of the concept of expert agency which has been
articulated by broader forms of the public rights exception in the
past. Additionally, that the Federal Circuit adopted a standard of
whether the administrative agency in question "acted in judicial
capacity" is telling-this holding marks, to the extent that the
notion had not already been demonstrated by Patlex and Joy, a
complete disavowal of the Supreme Court's public rights rubric. 48 3
IX. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit has clear, pragmatic concerns for
envisioning a patent system that allows for the meaningful
participation by administrative agencies. The act of granting a
patent is an imprecise process, and the various administrative
481 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986).
482 Texas Instruments v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
483 id
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mechanisms exist as quick, cost-efficient avenues for remedying
deficient patents that might otherwise find themselves locked into
costly, time-consuming litigation before an Article III court. This
has the net effect of reducing case load and preserving judicial
economy. However, as the Supreme Court just reminded the
nation in its important Stern v. Marshall decision, Article III still
has meaning, and its mandate dictating separation of powers still
controls. The public rights exception, as anachronistic and
unbending as some may have it, is still, per the high Court's
directive, the gatekeeper. In light of the ever-burgeoning
administrative scheme-and as applied to patents, the advent of the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board under the America Invents Act-
the delineating effect of the public rights exception, first conjured
in 1856, upon modem U.S. Government has yet to be fully
determined.
As difficult as it may be to envision a system without
administrative input shaping issued patent rights, it is equally
difficult to envision an argument regarding patent validity and
infringement that comports with the core aspects of the public
rights doctrine. As such, the issue appears ripe for challenge-
many will be watching if, and when, the Supreme Court sits to
review patents and public rights after Stern v. Marshall.
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